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I. INTRODUCTION
With the turn of 2010, America's struggle for clean, reliable energy
approached its fourth decade.1 Though unrealistic in hindsight, President
Nixon launched Project Independence in 1974, aiming to completely
eliminate America's reliance on foreign energy sources by 1980.2 Since that
time, the federal government has taken an increasingly active role in the
nation's energy security, promulgating sweeping energy reform bills each
decade. One of the federal government's most assertive actions in the
energy realm came with the passage of the 2005 Energy Policy Act (EPAct
2005), where it took substantially greater authority in supervising the
transmission of electricity across America.4 With increasing calls for a
nationally revamped electric grid, this heightened authority may burst into
the public spotlight.
Looking to the future, increased reliance on renewable energy sources,
particularly wind turbines, large-scale solar power, and biomass will be
crucial both to increase energy security and attempt to mitigate effects of
climate change. However, because much of the nation's renewable energy
resources are located in areas distant from cities in which energy is
J.D. Candidate 2011, The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law.
1 See generally DANIEL YERGIN, THE PRIZE: THE EPIC QUEST FOR OIL, MONEY, &
POWER (Simon & Schuster Inc. 2008) (1991) (providing comprehensive history of the
U.S. energy industry).
2 U.S. Department of Energy, "Energy Timeline," http://www.energy.gov/about/
timeline.htm (last visited Mar. 21, 2010).
3 See id.
4 See, e.g., Joseph T. Kelliher & Maria Farinella, The Changing Landscape of
Federal Energy Law, 61 ADMIN. L. REv. 611, 626 (2009) ("[T]he Energy Policy Act of
2005 brought about the most significant change in the laws FERC administers since the
New Deal and represents the largest single grant of regulatory power to FERC in the past
seventy years.").
5 Jim Rossi, The Trojan Horse of Electric Power Transmission Line Siting Authority,
39 ENVTL. L. 1015, 1016 (2009) (discussing the current transmission infrastructure's
inability to accommodate new renewable energy resources).
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consumed, policymakers have called for massive expansion of transmission
infrastructure. 6 As President Obama has already pledged $11 billion under
the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act for a "bigger, better, and
smarter grid" that will move renewable energy from the rural places in which
it is produced to the cities where it is mostly used,7 swaths of new land will
necessarily be designated for transmission facilities. Indeed, President
Obama has promised to "lay down more than 3,000 miles of transmission
lines . . from coast to coast.",8 To coordinate the grid on a national scale,
such an endeavor will necessarily require a far-sighted approach.9
However, rather than the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC),10 state agencies have traditionally claimed exclusive authority over
the siting-or the determination of line's location and its authorization-of
transmission lines." Linking cities and rural areas to power from
increasingly diverse sources, the North American electricity grid is a massive
and complex system.' 2 Projects updating the grid are often enormous in
scope, transcending state lines and requiring cooperation between multiple
6 Id. For instance, because of their distance from consumers in Chicago, wind
turbines in sparsely populated North Dakota and the Rocky Mountains require massive
new transmission infrastructure. Id. at 1029. For a concise overview of this issue, see
Matthew L. Wald, Wind Energy Bumps into Power Grid's Limits, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27,
2008, at Al.
7 White House Issues, Energy and the Environment,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/energy-and-environment (last visited Mar. 21, 2010).
8 Macon Phillips, The White House Blog, President Obama Delivers Your Weekly
Address, Jan. 24, 2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov/president-obama-delivers-your-
weekly-address (last visited Nov. 11, 2010).
9 Tara Benedetti, Running Roughshod? Extending Federal Siting Authority Over
Interstate Electric Transmission Lines, 47 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 253 (2010) (discussing
recent proposals to expand federal authority over the siting of electric transmission lines).
10 FERC is the federal agency charged with the regulation of the interstate
transmission of electricity, natural gas, and oil. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission,
What FERC Does, http://www.ferc.gov/about/ferc-does.asp (last visited Mar. 23, 2010).
11 Debbie Swanstrom & Meredith M. Jolivert, DOE Transmission Corridor
Designations & FERC Backstop Siting Authority: Has The Energy Policy Act of 2005
Succeeded in Stimulating the Development of New Transmission Facilities?, 30 ENERGY
L.J. 415,415 (2009); see also Rossi, supra note 5, at 1017.
12 See David H. Meyer & Richard Sedano, Transmission Siting and Permitting, in
NATIONAL TRANSMISSION GRID STUDY ISSUE PAPERS, E-1 (Dep't Energy May 2002),
available at http://www.ornl.gov/sci/btc/apps/RestructuringiNTGS%20Issues% 2 0
Papers.pdf (reviewing transmission siting and permit process, and documenting a host of
cases where agencies' disparate priorities and failures to effectively communicate with
one another have substantially impeded the construction of transmission lines).
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state and federal agencies.' 3  Despite the advantages of inter-agency
cohesion, states and reviewing agencies often favor projects that benefit their
own jurisdictions, with less concern for potential adverse impacts in others,
leading to delays and higher expenses in the siting process. 4 This process has
resulted in a patchwork of state-authorized facilities, inadequate in both
capacity and reliability.' 5 In response to these difficulties, EPAct 2005
granted FERC increased responsibility, allowing federal "backstop" authority
to site transmission lines under certain circumstances.' 6 Analogizing to
baseball, individual states act as the catcher, with the first chance to stop the
ball, and FERC acts as the backstop behind the catcher, used only if the
catcher fails to effectively field the ball. 7
In certain cases of a "missed pitch," i.e., a state's refusal or inability to
consider interstate benefits of in-state transmission lines, or extended delay in
state approval of a project, FERC may approve the project and grant a private
utility the right to use eminent domain authority to condemn needed land for
transmission facilities.' 8 Given the enormous scope of such transmission
projects, increased nationalization of transmission line siting potentially
represents a literal and figurative "power grab" by FERC from local
landowners and authorities.' 9 Moreover, a number of bills introduced in both
bodies of Congress call for increasing FERC's power to preempt state laws
in siting interstate transmission projects. 20 Though a goal of EPAct 2005 was
to streamline the siting of transmission facilities, relying increasingly on
eminent domain to overpower disgruntled landowners is not the best means
13 Id.
14 Id.; see also infra Part III.A.
15 DEP'T OF ENERGY, NATIONAL ELECTRIC TRANSMISSION CONGESTION STUDY 4
(2006) http://nietc.anl.gov/documents/docs/CongestionStudy.2006-9MB.pdf (last
visited Mar. 22, 2010).
16 Swanstrom & Jolivert, supra note 11.
17 Id. at 422.
18 16 U.S.C. § 824p(e) (2006) ("[I]f the permit holder cannot acquire by contract, or
is unable to agree with the owner of the property to the compensation to be paid for, the
necessary right-of-way to construct or modify the transmission facilities, the permit
holder may acquire the right-of-way by the exercise of the right of eminent domain in the
district court of the United States for the district in which the property concerned is
located, or in the appropriate court of the State in which the property is located.").
19 See, e.g., Jacob Dweck, David Wochner & Michael Brooks, Liquefied Natural
Gas (LNG) Litigation After the Energy Policy Act of 2005: State Powers in LNG
Terminal Siting, 27 ENERGY L.J. 473, 476 (2006) (discussing early criticism of EPAct
2005).
20 See infra Part IIl.C (reviewing these bills).
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of advancing this goal. Widespread federal use of eminent domain is likely
to anger landowners attempting to retain their private property rights, and
could potentially unleash a public outcry against the perceived overuse of
governmental condemnation power.2 1 In any event, EPAct 2005's protocol
for siting interstate transmission lines should be revised to foster procedural
justice for landowners as well as greater efficiency.
This note proposes mediation as a solution to the inefficiencies and
social injustices inherent in power companies' use of eminent domain under
FERC's interstate transmission line-siting regime. Part II of the note briefly
discusses FERC's longstanding vesting of private energy companies with
eminent domain power under the Natural Gas Act (NGA). Part III examines
electric companies' use of eminent domain power, discussing state regimes,
federal backstop jurisdiction under EPAct 2005, and bills proposing
expansion of this power in Congress. Part IV discusses states' reform to
eminent domain law since the Supreme Court's holding in Kelo v. City of
New London, focusing on measures increasing public participatory
requirements. This section then considers the effects such reforms may have
on the siting of transmission lines. Part V discusses the need for an improved
process for the federal siting of interstate transmission facilities that would
effectively balance private property rights with the need to quickly update the
nation's electric transmission infrastructure. Here, this note argues that
enhancing opportunities for the public to participate in the siting process can
increase the quality of decisions made as well as these decisions' legitimacy,
without compromising efficiency. Finally, Part VI advocates for mediation
as the best means to advance these goals, providing an overview of a
multilateral mediation model and procedural recommendations.
II. BACKGROUND: ENERGY COMPANIES' USE OF EMINENT DOMAIN UNDER
THE NATURAL GAS ACT
Under the Fifth Amendment, the government may take privately-owned
property and convert it to public use, so long as it demonstrates a public need
for the project and adequately compensates the property owner for its loss. 22
21 See, e.g., The Kelo Decision: Investigating Takings of Homes and Other Private
Property, Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 14 (2005)
(statement of Prof. Thomas W. Merrill, Charles Evan Hughes Professor, Columbia Law
School) (stating that "the American people believe that property rights are invested with
moral significance").
22 U.S. CONST. amend. V; First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v.
Los Angeles County, Cal., 482 U.S. 304, 314 (1987).
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While historically this power was justified simply by government's sovereign
power, modem theorists cite takings power as the most efficient mechanism
for the government to fulfill its role as the provider of public goods.23 This
efficiency justification often rests upon the premise that the government
would be the highest-value owner of a given piece of property.24 Holdout
problems create another compelling justification for the government's
takings power.2 1 If, in the midst of a large-scale government project, a single
landowner refuses to surrender his land to the project, this could destroy the
entire project. 26 With knowledge of the government's irreplaceable need for
his land, this landowner may insist upon an unreasonably high price for the. . .. 
,27
land to maximize his personal profit at the public's expense. A practical
solution to this difficulty, therefore, is to allow the government to seize the
property against the landowner's will, so long as it provides adequate
28
compensation.
Since the nineteenth century, by virtue of their satisfying a traditional
governmental function, the government has in some circumstances delegated
eminent domain power to private entities.29 Across many states, companies in
the business of building electric facilities, roads, turnpikes, canals, railroads,
water systems, sanitary sewer systems, and television satellite systems have
all utilized takings power.3 ° Under these laws, companies addressing
enumerated public interests may independently exercise eminent domain
power in a manner similar to that which the government would exercise
independently. While critics have charged that private takings power violates
the Fifth Amendment's "public use" requirement, courts have generally held
private takings constitutional so long as they provide a public benefit
sufficient to justify the use of eminent domain.3'
23 See Abraham Bell, Private Takings, 76 U. CHI. L. REv. 517, 529 (2009)
(comprehensively discussing societal justifications for eminent domain doctrine, both
historical and modem).
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Id.
271d.
28 Id.
29 Bell, supra note 23, at 529
3 0 Id. at 546.
31 Id. at 547.
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Providing the public with reliable energy is one frequently exercised
public use sufficient to justify a taking.32 Although the FERC, until the
passage of EPAct 2005, lacked jurisdiction over the siting of transmission
lines, it has long retained national jurisdiction over the siting of gas lines
under the Natural Gas Act (NGA).33 Here, the FERC grants power companies
certificates of public convenience and necessity to allow them to undertake a
specified range of activities needed to carry out their routine business.
34
These are required for any gas company to operate in a given area.35 When
unable to agree with property owners on compensation to be paid for
easements to construct, operate, and maintain gas pipelines, holders of these
certificates may circumvent state authority and acquire eminent domain
rights in federal district courts.36 Power companies may further obtain
blanket certificates, under which, rather than needing FERC approval on a
project-by-project basis, they may undertake an unlimited number of projects
without specific FERC approval.37 Provided that these companies meet
minimal notification standards, blanket certification holders retain floating
eminent domain power, where they can affect a taking on any property they
38deem necessary.
A. Negotiation Requirements
Importantly, in these and any eminent domain proceedings, a condemnor
must first attempt to negotiate an agreement with the landowner to acquire
the needed property rights by contract before utilizing its takings power.3 9
Under the NGA, however, the required quality and extent of the requisite
negotiations remains unclear.40 District courts have split over whether there
32 See, e.g., Coronado Oil Co. v. Grieves, 603 P.2d 406, 411 (Wyo. 1979) (citing the
"great public interest in an imminent need for energy").
33 15 U.S.C. §§ 717-717z (2000).
34 Id. § 717f (2000).
35 Id.
36 Id. § 717f(h) (2000). While the statute does allow State courts to grant takings
power, takings in State courts under the NGA are extremely rare. See Jim Behnke &
Harold Dondis, The Sage Approach to Immediate Entry By Private Entities Exercising
Federal Eminent Domain Authority Under The Natural Gas Act and The Federal Power
Act, 27 ENERGY L.J. 499, 504 (2006).
31 18 C.F.R. § 157.203 (2010).
38 Behnke & Dondis, supra note 36, at 505.
39 Id. at 509.
40 Id.
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is an implied requirement to negotiate in good faith under the NGA. On one
hand, some jurisdictions have required power companies, at minimum, to
make an offer to purchase right of way from a landowner.4' On the other
hand, the language of the NGA contains no express good faith negotiations
mandate, simply requiring:
When any holder of a certificate of public convenience and necessity
cannot acquire by contract, or is unable to agree with the owner ofproperty
to the compensation to be paid for, the necessary right-of-way to construct,
operate, and maintain a pipe line or pipe lines for the transportation of
natural gas, and the necessary land or other property... it may acquire the
same by the exercise of the right of eminent domain in the district court of
the United States for the district in which such property may be located, or
in the State courts.42
As such, courts have frequently cited the lack of any mention of a good
faith negotiations requirement in the statutory language above as indicative
of them not being required.43
Generally speaking, courts have favored power companies over private
landowners in eminent domain disputes under the NGA. 44  Indeed,
Congress's very intent in allowing eminent domain under the NGA was to
create a procedure that would reduce the ability of a financially-motivated
landowner to halt pipeline construction.45 Given this intent, it is natural that
courts have been reluctant to require a power company to negotiate in good
faith, as such a mandate would inevitably slow an already tedious
construction process. Still, the presence of good faith negotiation
41 See, e.g., Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Corp. v. 118 Acres of Land, 745 F. Supp. 366
(E.D. La. 1990) (finding that a power company's offer based on an appraisal of the
affected properties using standard methodologies, along with meeting twice with the
property owner was sufficient to satisfy the good faith negotiation requirement).
42 15 U.S.C. § 717f(h) (2000) (emphasis added).
43 Kan. Pipeline Co. v. A 200 by 250 Foot Piece of Land, 210 F. Supp. 2d 1253,
1257 (D. Kan. 2002) (reviewing cases in which courts imposed a good faith negotiations
requirement, as well those wherein this was not required).
44 Lauren Mohr, The Tangled Web: Regulation, Interstate Pipeline Companies, and
Due Process Rights of Property Owners, 26 ENERGY L.J. 191 (2005) (providing overview
of eminent domain procedure under the NGA and citing an array of cases).
45 Humphries v. Williams Natural Gas Co., 48 F. Supp. 2d 1276, 1279 (D. Kan.
1999). The legislative history of EPAct 2005 reflects an identical concern, though with
respect to transmission lines. See R. Seth Davis, Conditional Preemption,
Commandeering, and The Values of Cooperative Federalism: An Analysis of Section 216
Of EPAct, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 404, 408 n.29 (2008).
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requirements in some jurisdictions reflects a degree of judicial sensitivity to
landowners' basic property rights, and most likely stems to an extent from
due process concerns as well.
B. Due Process
The Fifth Amendment's requirement that "no person shall . . . be
deprived. .. of property, without due process of law' '4 6 poses a challenge to
the legitimacy of takings by power companies. Although the Fifth
Amendment provides no such requirement for conduct by private actors, by
employing federal eminent domain power, a fundamental government
function, courts have held that power companies gain the status of a
government actor.47 As government-authorized actors exercising a traditional
government function, utilities should be held to a similar due process
standard as the government itself
48
At a minimum, due process requires "notice and an opportunity to be
heard[,]... 'granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner' before
a person may be finally deprived of his constitutionally protected interests. ' ' 9
Under the NGA, property owners may voice their concerns over a blanket
certificate holder's actions to the FERC, and the Federal Rules provide a
FERC Enforcement Hotline, where aggrieved landowners may attempt to
resolve disputes informally with the Hotline Staff.50 However, commentators
have questioned whether this hotline provides property owners the
opportunity to be heard at a time and manner sufficiently meaningful to
satisfy due process concerns. 51 Indeed, when a power company holds a
blanket certificate, the FERC has been generally reluctant to hear individual
cases, having explained:
4 6 U.S. CONST. amend. V; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (applying this principle
to the states).
47 Pavelich v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of Amer. 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23946,
2002 WL 31804410 (N.D. I11. Dec. 12, 2002).
48 Mohr, supra note 44, at 191.
4 9 Id. (quoting Denver Welfare Rights Org. v. Colo. Pub. Util. Comm 'n, 547 P.2d
239, 247 (Colo. 1976) (en banc)).
50 18 C.F.R. § 157.203 (2010) (authorizing unsatisfied landowners to call the
Hotline). "Any person may seek information or the informal resolution of a dispute by
calling or writing to the Hotline .... The Hotline Staff will informally seek information
from the caller and any respondent, as appropriate. The Hotline Staff will attempt to
resolve disputes without litigation or other formal proceedings." Id § 1 b.2 1(b).
51 See Mohr, supra note 44, at 197-200.
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[W]e perceive no legal, policy or administrative purpose to be served
by continuing to process applications for authority to perform transactions
that the applicant has full authority to perform. The Commission has limited
resources, and those resources are best allocated to the processing of
applications whose grant or denial will have a meaningful and tangible
effect on the service that can be rendered. 2
With the constitutional right of due process within the FERC already
reduced to a telephone hotline wherein property owners may voice their
concerns only informally, these landowners often lack a meaningful venue in
the federal courts. Once blanket certificate holders invoke eminent domain
power, landowners utilize federal district courts to litigate over the amount of
compensation for the taking, but not over the issue of the taking itself.53 In
this context, federal courts have explicitly limited their forum in eminent
domain proceedings to one for deciding the issue of proper compensation,
"not... an additional forum to attack the substance and validity of a FERC
order., 54 Lacking power to have their concerns heard by either the FERC or
district courts, it is questionable whether aggrieved landowners retain
procedural due process rights.
III. USE OF EMINENT DOMAIN TO SITE TRANSMISSION LINES:
STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES UNDER STATE REGIMES, FERC, AND
PROPOSED CHANGES
Basic differences between natural gas pipelines and electric transmission
lines give rise to issues largely unprecedented under the NGA. Most
critically, natural gas pipelines are underground, thus giving rise to
substantially fewer property concerns than are associated with the siting of
above-ground, highly visible transmission lines.
A number of studies have found that the presence of electric transmission
lines adversely affects property values, and that this effect is particularly
robust in rural areas, where estimates of value reduction have in some cases
52 Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 43 F.E.R.C. P 61,042, 61,126 (1988). See also Mohr,
supra note 44, at 198 n. 41 (reviewing cases that demonstrate the FERC's general
deferral of case-specific siting decisions to private entities holding blanket certificates).
53 Mohr, supra note 44, at 200-02.
54 Williams Natural Gas Co. v. City of Okla. City, 890 F.2d 255, 269 (10th Cir.
1989) (reversing a district court's injunction against a power company's exercise of rights
under its FERC-granted certificate of public convenience and necessity).
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exceeded 15 percent." In stark contrast, the presence of underground natural
gas lines has never been shown to have an affect on property values.56 As
such, landowners have often vehemently resisted the construction of
transmission lines near their property, and by doing so have often been at the
core of the transmission line projects' delay or failure." Consequently,
regimes siting electric transmission lines must consider issues related to
private property to a greater extent than those siting natural gas lines. In
particular, courts may be faced with the task of balancing the national goal of
expediting the siting of interstate transmission lines against local property
interests. 8
"Perhaps the greatest obstacle to the construction of new [electric]
transmission [capability] . . . is the age-old problem of gaining approval for
new transmission lines.",59 This phenomenon, often referred to as "Not In
My Backyard" (NIMBY), where local landowners, though potentially in
favor of the construction of a given structure that would benefit the public,
do not want to bear the burden of seeing this facility near their own
communities, applies with particular potency to the siting of transmission
lines.6 °
55 Cynthia A. Kroll & Thomas Priestly, The Effects of Overhead Transmission Lines
on Property Values: A Review and Analysis of the Literature (Internet Edition 2003),
available at http://staff.haas.berkeley.edu/kroll/pubs/tranline.pdf; see also Stanley W.
Hamilton & Gregory M. Schwann, Do High Voltage Electric Transmission Lines Affect
Property Value?, 71 LAND ECON. 436 (1995) (concluding, based on empirical research,
that properties adjacent to a transmission line lose an average of 6.3% of their value,
primarily as a result of proximity and visual impact).
56 Eric Fruits, Natural Gas Pipelines and Residential Property Values: Evidence
from Clackamas and Washington Counties, (Unpublished Draft, Feb. 20, 2008),
http://pdx.academia.edu/documents/0046/7196/2008_NaturalGas Pipelines_andReside
ntial PropertyValues.pdf (last visited Apr. 2, 2010). This recent study was the only the
author could fmd on the subject of natural gas pipelines and property values. The lack of
work on this subject is itself evidence of this issue's relative unimportance, and stands in
plain contrast to the presence of extensive literature on the effect of above-ground electric
transmission lines on property values.
57 Ward Jewell, A New Method for Public Involvement in Electric Transmission-
Line Routing, 24 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON POWER DELIVERY 2240, 2240 (2009).
58 See generally Steven J. Eagle, Securing a Reliable Electricity Grid: A New Era in
Transmission Siting Regulation?, 73 TENN. L. REV. 1 (2005) (discussing the need for new
transmission capacity and siting obstacles, reviewing and assessing EPAct 2005's
effects).
59 Id. at3.
60 Rossi, supra note 5, at 1021-23.
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Local opposition to transmission line projects has prevented or delayed
their construction in numerous cases, frequently in cases where their
development is much needed for local, regional, and even national energy
reliability.61 For instance, local opposition based around environmental
impacts on native plants, wildlife, and archaeological sites caused the failure
to build a 230 mile, high-voltage transmission line from Blythe, California,
to the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, fifty miles west of Phoenix,
Arizona.62 Although California regulators approved the project, Arizona
rejected it because of the above concerns and its lack of benefit to Arizona
citizens.63 Most essentially, Arizonians objected to the transmission line's
use of "our land, our air and our water to provide electricity to California.
64
Generally, local opposition to a major electricity infrastructure facility is
at the heart of its failure to be built, and in a highly charged, politicized
atmosphere, demonstration of public need for the facility seems inadequate to
persuade local landowners to its favor. Indeed, a project's success is usually
dependent on site-specific circumstances, including local economic
conditions, the community's need for tax revenues that would flow from the
facility's development, population density, and the composition of local
65political bodies responsible for the siting process. In response to the
interaction between these difficulties and the need to "expedite the
construction of critical transmission lines identified by the [Department of
Energy], 66 Congress passed EPAct 2005, amending the Federal Power Act
(FPA) to create partial federal jurisdiction over the electricity grid.67
However, because FERC acts only as a "backstop" authority behind state
61 Eagle, supra note 58, at 25.
62 S. Cal. Edison Co., Case No. 130, Decision No. 69638 (Ariz. Corp. Comm'n June
6, 2007), 2007 WL 2126365, available at http://images.edocket.azcc.gov/docketpdf
/0000073735.pdf.
63 Id.
64 Press Release, Ariz. Corp. Comm'n, Regulators Reject "Extension Cord for
California": Commissioners Reject Palo Verde to Devers II Power Line 2 (May 30,
2007), available at http://www.cc.state.az.us/divisions/administration/news/Dever
sIIVote.pdf (quoting Commissioner Bill Mundell).
65 Id.
66 H.R. REP. No. 108-65, at 170 (2003).
67 FERC, A Guide to the FERC Electric Transmission Facilities Permit Process,
available at http://www.ferc.gov/for-citizens/citizen-guides/electric/guide-transmission-
8-08.pdf. It is worth noting, however, that any siting commission must address a myriad
of concerns aside from the landowners', including complex environmental assessments,
safety issues, sufficiency of financing for the project, the degree of need for the project,
and the merit of proposed alternatives. See id.
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jurisdiction, and even this authority exists only in specially designated
regions of the country, individual state procedures remain predominant.
68
A. Siting Transmission Lines Under State Regimes
Historically, state agencies exclusively authorized the construction of
transmission lines, while FERC's role was quite circumscribed. 69  Due
largely to the limited distance over which electricity could travel, there was
only limited need for cohesion among utilities from diverse locations.7 °
However, technological advances and expanding markets have demanded
that electricity be moved over greater distances, often crossing state
boundaries or entire regions. 71 Further, the emergence of larger companies
operating across state lines, regionally-based regulatory standards, and states
depending on one another for electricity supplies has increasingly demanded
regional cooperation and planning.72
Still, states retain initial jurisdiction over transmission line siting, and
each state has its own procedure for approving a project, which it administers
either through its public utilities commission or a separate siting board.73
While each state does have its own siting protocol, landowners in most states
may become involved in the siting process by applying for intervenor status,
granted upon showing that they have an interest that is not already
adequately represented.
Enormous in scale, some new transmission projects may run through an
entire state without providing substantial benefit to the state itself.
74
Importantly, while some state procedures do allow siting commissions to
consider benefits to other states, others require a showing of benefit for
68 16 U.S.C. § 824p(b) (2006).
69 Swanstrom & Jolivert, supra note 11, at 418.
70 Transmission Access Policy Study Group v. FERC, 225 F.3d 667, 681 (D.C. Cir.
2000), aff'd, 535 U.S. 1 (2002) (cited in Swanstrom & Jolivert, supra note 11).
71 National Council on Electricity Policy, Coordinating Interstate Electric
Transmission Siting: An Introduction to the Debate 2 (July 2008) (cited in Swanstrom &
Jolivert, supra note 11).
72 Swanstrom & Jolivert, supra note 11, at 419.
73 Eagle, supra note 58, at 13.
74 Mark A. de Figueiredo, A Regulatory Framework for Investments in Electricity
Transmission Infrastructure, 26 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 445, 450 (2008) (arguing for a siting
approach that better coordinates FERC and individual states); see also Eagle, supra note
58, at 25.
228
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citizens of that state.75 Stemming from their historic role evaluating
proposals in relative isolation from interstate concerns, many states still tend
to focus on their own needs, rather than regional ones.76
New transmission lines generally must run through privately owned land,
requiring utilities to obtain easements in order to begin construction.77
Because of the sheer number of private properties often implicated by such
projects, utilities frequently are unable to acquire these easements through
negotiations with landowners, and instead resort to eminent domain.78 To
exercise the power of eminent domain, a utility must demonstrate a public
need for the project.79 Many states may not use eminent domain power for a
public use outside their own borders when there is no substantial benefit to
citizens of that state.8°
As such, in response to attempted takings by utilities for the construction
of large interstate transmission lines, some state courts have held that the
construction of power lines in their state, while improving regional stability,
will not provide enough benefit to citizens of that state to justify the use of
eminent domain. 8' However, courts vary in their requirements of nexus
between transmission projects and in-state benefits, with some more willing
75 Figueiredo, supra note 74, at 450.
76 Id.; see also Eagle, supra note 58, at 25.
77 Eagle, supra note 58, at 13.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 See Adams v. Greenwich Water Co., 138 Conn. 205, 214 (Conn. 1951); Shedd v.
N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co., 188 N.E. 322, 326 (Ind. 1934) (holding that the test of right of
power company to condemn right of way easement for transmission lines is whether use
is public use which will serve interests of people of state); see also Rocky Mountain
Mineral Law Institute, Acquisition of Mining and Mine-Related Rights Through Eminent
Domain, 27 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 757 (1982) (stating that, "although other states
may also be benefitted, the public in the state which authorizes the taking must derive a
substantial and direct benefit"); J.T.W., State Power of Eminent Domain as Affected by
Interstate Character of Uses to Which Property Taken Is to Be Devoted, 90 A.L.R. 1032,
1035 (1934) ("The rule is apparently well settled that property cannot be condemned by
virtue of the state's power of eminent domain, if no direct benefit from its proposed use is
to accrue to the state in which it is located, or to at least a few inhabitants thereof.").
81 Id.; see also Ashley C. Brown & Damon Daniels, Vision Without Site: Site
Without Vision, ELECTRICITY J., Oct. 2003, at 23 (reviewing states' varying willingness to
consider out-of-state benefits in siting and granting eminent domain powers to utilities for
transmission projects).
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than others to consider out-of-state benefits. 82 On the parochial extreme, for
example, The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has held that its
Energy Facilities Siting Board is without authority to approve a transmission
project unless that project benefits in-state consumers.8 3 Likewise, state
transmission line siting statutes of New York84 and Florida8 5 do not mention
consideration of interstate benefits. At the other end of the spectrum, "a few
states ... have authorized siting officials to assess regional considerations in
determining the need for an electricity project. 8 6 Generally, however, most
states fall somewhere between these extremes, although "in most states,
parochialism casts a significant, although not always determinative, shadow
over the process by which electricity projects clear the necessary legalhurdles. ' 7
Although EPAct 2005 has made a significant stride toward increased
regionalization and nationalization of the siting of transmission lines,
because the FERC has only backstop authority, state laws remain
predominant. The FERC's jurisdiction over electric lines has generally
moved transmission projects forward not directly under its own protocol, but
indirectly through influence over states' internal siting procedures. These
procedures thus remain crucial to utilities' use of eminent domain to site such
projects.88 In the common case that the FERC's backstop jurisdiction is not
82 For a discussion, see Rossi, supra note 5, at 1025-34; see also Brown & Daniels,
supra note 81.
83 Point of Pines Beach Ass'n v. Energy Facilities Siting Bd., 644 N.E.2d 221, 223-
24 (Mass. 1995); see also, Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Conerly, 460 So. 2d 107 (Miss.
1984) (The court to grant eminent domain for transmission line siting because "not one
Mississippi customer is to be served by the proposed transmission line .... The terms
'public necessity' and 'public use' as set out in the statutes that regulate the duties of the
[Mississippi Public Service Commission], contemplate use by the citizens of this state.").
84 See N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAW § 126 (Consol. 2009).
85 See Florida Electric Power Plant Siting Act, FLA. STAT. §§ 403.501-.518 (2009);
Florida Electric Transmission Line Siting Act, FLA. STAT. §§ 403.52-.5365 (2009).
86 Brown & Daniels, supra note 81, at 32. See, e.g., OHo REv. CODE. ANN.
§ 4906.10 (West 2009) (including consideration of whether "the facility is consistent
with regional plans for expansion of the electric power grid of the electric systems
serving this state and interconnected utility systems and that the facility will serve the
interests of electric system economy and reliability" in its statutory regime for
transmission line siting).
87 Brown & Daniels, supra note 81, at 25.
88 Swanstrom & Jolivert, supra note 11, at 457. See infra Part III.B (discussing the
FERC's backstop siting procedure).
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actually invoked, state procedure will govern transmission lines siting, and
thus each affected state separately approves the project.89
As such, even in spite of federal backstop authority, states may be prone
to give weight to parochial concerns such as aesthetics, driven in part by
local political support and short-term politics, at the expense of national
priorities. 90 Driven in part by this concern, Congress passed EPAct 2005,
increasing federal jurisdiction for the siting of transmission lines in
designated regions of the country.
B. FERC's Backstop Siting Process Under The Energy Policy Act of
2005
EPAct 2005 amended the Federal Power Act (FPA) to grant the FERC
backstop jurisdiction over two large regions of the U.S., referred to as
National Interest Electric Transmission Corridors. 91 As backstop authority,
the FERC review is entirely separate from state-level review, applying only
in five circumstances.92 They are when: (1) a state in which the transmission
facilities are to be constructed or modified does not have the authority to
approve the siting;93 (2) a state does not have the authority to consider the
expected interstate benefits to be achieved by the proposed project;94 (3) a
89 Eagle, supra note 58, at 13.
90 Id. at 25.
91 16 U.S.C. § 824p(a) (2006). These were created by the Department of Energy
(DOE) in 2007, but the DOE retains the ability to create more such corridors. Presently,
the first, the Mid-Atlantic Area National Corridor, includes parts of New York, New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, West Virginia, Ohio, and
Washington, D.C. The second, the Southwest Area National Corridor, stretches across
parts of California, Nevada, Utah, and Arizona. See Dep't of Energy, National Electric
Transmission Corridor Report and the Ordered National Corridor Designations, available
at http://nietc.anl.gov/nationalcorridor/index.cfm.
On Feb. 1, 2011, the Ninth Circuit vacated the DOE's designation of both of these
Corridors, holding that in creating these areas the agency failed both to consult with the
affected states as mandated by EPAct 2005 and to evaluate the environmental impact of
the designations as required by the National Environmental Policy Act. Cal. Wilderness
Coal. v. U.S. Dep't of Energy, No. 08-71074, slip op. (9th Cir. Feb. 1, 2011). The court
held that the DOE must fulfill both of these requirements to re-designate the Corridors or
to create new ones. Id. at 1947, 1967.
92 See 16 U.S.C. §824p(b) (2006) (identifying the conditions for the FERC's
authority to be triggered).
93 Id. § 824p(l)(A)(i).
94 Id. § 824p(l)(A)(ii).
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permit applicant is a transmitting utility under the FPA, but does not qualify
for a permit in a particular state because it does not serve end-use customers
in that state;95 (4) a state commission has withheld approval for more than
one year after the filing of an application or the designation of the relevant
national interest corridor, whichever is later;96 or (5) a state commission has
conditioned its approval in such a manner that the proposed construction or
modification is not economically feasible or will not significantly reduce
transmission congestion in interstate commerce.97
Generally, these provisions reflect Congress's intent to allow FERC to
act only when state actions would impede the development of projects whose
benefits transcend that state.98 As illustrated, FERC may exercise siting
authority over states such as New York and Florida, which refuse to consider
out-of-state benefits in their siting regimes, and therefore may preempt the
most parochially oriented states. 99 Alternatively, FERC may preempt states
that delay projects for over a year.100 Thus, although FERC's backstop
jurisdiction does represent a step toward the federalization of transmission
siting, Congress nonetheless limited this authority to relatively narrow
circumstances, illustrating its concern for local needs and desire to retain
state primacy.'01
Under its siting regime, FERC requires a regimented pre-filing
procedure, and with it elaborate public integration requirements to
accommodate local interests. Pre-filing is a process required prior to actual
filing, where FERC defines the specific issues raised by the project, and
begins its independent environmental analysis.10 2 During this segment of the
review, FERC requires initial consultations with applicants, ensures all
affected landowners are notified, and gathers stakeholder input.' °3
The pre-filing process is used largely to consider the effects of the
proposed facilities on individual landowners and local communities, and give
all interested entities or individuals (stakeholders) opportunities to be
95 Id. § 824p(l)(B).
96 Id. § 824p(1)(C)(i).
97 Id. § 824p(b)(1)(C)(ii).
98 Piedmont Envtl. Council v. F.E.R.C., 558 F.3d 304, 313-14 (4th Cir. 2009), cert.
denied, U.S. No. 09-343 (Jan. 19, 2010) (refusing to allow the FERC permitting authority
when a state has affirmatively denied a permit application within one year).
99 16 U.S.C. § 824p(l)(B) (2006).
100 Id.
101 Piedmont, 558 F.3d at 313-14.
102 71 Fed. Reg. 69,440, 69,452 (Dec. 1, 2006).
103 18 C.F.R. § 50.5 (2009).
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heard. °4 In addition to making a good faith effort to notify all affected
landowners of the project, applicants must develop a Project Participation
Plan, which demonstrates specific tools and actions that facilitate outreach to
the public, providing accurate and timely information to all stakeholders.
10 5
Once the formal application is filed, stakeholders who want to remain
involved may file a motion to formally intervene in the case. 10 6 Clearly, the
FERC in its siting process intends to integrate the public to a large extent,
expressly "offer[ing] numerous occasions for stakeholders to express their
interests and make meaningful contributions."
' 10 7
However, the FERC's process does not achieve this goal at a satisfactory
level. For one, while the Project Participation plans are likely to facilitate
communication and help make information more available, they are not
designed toward consensus-building.'0 8 Rather, public officials will be more
likely to allow these public participation efforts "just for show."' 1 9 Moreover,
in the case of FERC preemption of state authority, it is likely that a state,
rather than a federal agency, would most thoroughly consider landowner
interests.1 0 Because local officials answer to the community they serve, they
are likely to give much greater weight to concerns of local landowners than
would the federal regime."' Despite the FERC's efforts toward inclusion,
increasing regionalization, especially in combination with federal backstop
authority, has been criticized frequently as unlikely to adequately respond to
104 71 Fed. Reg. 69,440-01, 69,452 (Dec. 1, 2006); see also 18 C.F.R. pt. 50 (2009)
(stating that the purpose of the pre-filing process is to "facilitate maximum participation
from all interested entities and individuals and to assist an applicant in compiling the
information needed to file a complete application").
105 71 Fed. Reg. 69,440-01 (Dec. 1, 2006).
106 18 C.F.R. pt. 50.
107 71 Fed. Reg. 69,450 (Dec. 1, 2006).
108 Jonathon Raab & Lawrence Susskind, New Approaches to Consensus Building
and Speeding up Large-Scale Energy Infrastructure Projects 5, Presented at Conference:
The Expansion of the German Transmission Grid (Gottingen University, Germany June
23, 2009), available at http://web.mit.edu/dusp/epp/pdfs/NewApproachesConsensus_
Building.pdf.
109 Id. at 10.
110 See Eagle, supra note 58, at 27-31 (comparing the influence local concerns have
on local agencies as opposed to the influence that they have on regional or federal
agencies in transmission siting).
111 Id. at 25; see also Brown & Daniels, supra note 81, at 25 ("In most states,
parochialism casts a significant, although not always determinative, shadow over the
process by which electricity projects clear the necessary legal hurdles.").
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landowner concerns. 12 Critics have marshaled additional concern that over
time, increased federal authority could erode local power as the FERC
preempts more state administrations." 13 Evidencing the fact that citizens
themselves share this concern, a recent poll found that while only 10% of
respondents said the federal government should have ultimate authority to
site transmission lines, 60% preferred delegating this responsibility to local
government.'1 4 Currently, however, state regimes remain predominant.
Moreover, neither the FPA nor the FERC's regulations mandate public
hearings in areas affected by plans for transmission lines." 5 These hearings
would offer participants opportunities to learn more about the project, views
of similarly situated citizens, and discuss their concerns with each other and
the project developers." 6 In response to the inadequacies of the public
participation mechanisms currently in place, members of Congress have
introduced twin pieces of legislation in the House and Senate seeking to
amend the FPA to require public hearings." 7 Here, the FERC would be
required to hold "at least [one] public hearing in each county and locality
affected."" 8 As of this writing, these bills remain in committee," 9 and as
drafted provide venues for landowners to vent their concerns, but no
measures to actually empower the public.120 Nonetheless, these bills'
112 See Meyer & Sedano, supra note 12, at E-2 1.
113 Id.
114 Saint Consulting Group, National Survey: Opposition To Power Transmission
Lines, available at http://tscg.biz/saintblog/2009/05/national-survey-opposition-to-power-
transmission-lines.html.
115 Neither 16 U.S.C. § 824(p), the statute controlling the siting of interstate electric
transmission facilities, nor 18 C.F.R. pt. 50, the FERC's corresponding regulation,
mention public hearings.
116 James B. Lebeck, Liquefied Natural Gas Terminals, Community
Decisionmaking, and the 2005 Energy Policy Act, 85 TEX. L. REv. 243, 255-56 (2006).
For example, EPAct 2005 does mandate public hearings for the siting of liquid natural
gas terminals. 18 C.F.R. § 157.21(f) (2009). Liquid natural gas terminals do, however,
cause significantly greater environmental and health risks to locals than do transmission
lines. See generally Lebeck, 85 TEX. L. REv. at 260-63. (discussing these risks).
117 S. 32, 11 1th Cong. (2009) (introduced Jan. 6); H.R. 1922, 11 1th Cong. (2009)
(introduced Apr. 2).
118 Id.
119According to their statuses on GovTrack.us as of Mar. 23, 2010. See
GovTrack.us, Tracking the U.S. Congress, http://www.govtrack.us/ (last visited Oct. 26,
2009).
120 See Raab & Susskind, supra note 108, at 10.
[Vol. 26:1 20111
'ENERGIZED' NEGOTIATIONS
presence illustrates Congressional concern over the integration of the public
in the FERC's interstate transmission facility siting proceedings.
When power companies do attempt to utilize eminent domain under the
FPA, courts are likely to look to precedent under the Natural Gas Act
(NGA). 12 1 Upon FERC approval of a project, the power company negotiates
its right-of-way with each affected landowner, with the looming power of
eminent domain up its sleeve.122 In this situation, the landowner has little
recourse but to settle with the power company. Importantly, in language
similar to that of the NGA, Section 216(e)(3) of the FPA states:
The practice and procedures of any action or proceeding conducted
under this subsection in the district court of the United States shall conform
as nearly as practicable to the practice and procedures in a similar action or
proceeding in the courts of the State in which the property is located.
Consequently, local courts will decide the appropriate procedures for
individual eminent domain proceedings, and these will likely resemble
those used under the NGA. 123 With state taking laws increasingly
diversified since the Supreme Court's holding in Kelo v. City of New
London,124 this provision leaves open the question of how eminent domain
litigation will unfold under EPAct 2005.125
To date, there has been only one request for backstop siting authority to
the FERC, and this request was subsequently withdrawn.126 Consequently,
there is little empirical evidence on which to base analysis of the current
procedure's efficacy, or the degree to which landowners will have the
opportunity to be heard "in a meaningful manner" to satisfy due process.
While the FERC's new eminent domain power has not yet been used, it is
arguable that the mere threat of federal preemptive power has induced states
to be increasingly likely to approve transmission projects under their own
121 Swanstrom & Jolivert, supra note 11, at 452.
122 16 U.S.C. § 824p(e) (2006).
123 71 Fed. Reg. 69,463 (Dec. 1, 2006) (FERC's final ruling, implementing
regulations under EPAct 2005).
124 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). See infra IV.
125 71 Fed. Reg. 69643 (Dec. 1, 2006). "[lIt is for the court to decide what
procedures are appropriate for their individual proceedings." Id.
126 Application of S. Cal. Edison Co. for Certificate of Pub. Convenience and
Necessity to Construct the Devers-Palo Verde No. 2 Transmission Line Project, Cal.
PUC (Apr. 11, 2005).
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procedures.'27 Although state siting regimes have thus far remained
predominant, federal backstop authority represents a step toward greater
consideration of regional and national needs, and less consideration of local
needs, thus jeopardizing property rights of local landowners. 28
C. Bills to Further Expand Federal Authority over Siting of Interstate
Transmission Lines
Limits to the FERC's backstop authority have led many members of
Congress to call for even greater federal authority for the siting of interstate
transmission lines. 29 Legislators have argued, for one, that federal siting
authority may be procedurally beneficial, eliminating the need for interstate
projects to navigate bureaucracy caused by the presence of several state
siting authorities. 30 Supporters also claim that the FERC, having sited
interstate natural gas lines for the past sixty-five years, is the most competent
body to handle large-scale transmission projects. 3 1 Finally, proponents of a
more nationalized siting regime charge that state agencies have given too
much consideration of NIMBY and other localized concerns, at the expense
of weightier national interests. 132 As a whole, this legislation stems from
Congressional concern that EPAct 2005 has left too much authority with the
states, and thus may not have given the FERC enough authority to facilitate
siting approval in certain areas of the country. 3 3 The bulk of this legislation,
however, fails to give proper consideration to the effects increased federal
127 Swanstrom & Jolivert, supra note 11, at 457.
128 Eagle, supra note 58, at 43.
129 See generally Benedetti, supra note 9 (reviewing legislation).
130 Id. at 260.
131 Id.
13 2 Id. at 260-61.
133 Transmission Infrastructure: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Energy and
Natural Resources, llth Cong. 66-67 (Mar. 12, 2009) (statement of James A.
Dickenson, Managing Director and Chief Executive Officer, JEA). See also Jim Rossi,
The Political Economy of Energy and its Implications for Climate Change Legislation, 84
TuL. L. REV. 379, 428 (2009) ("If Congress does not expand FERC's limited authority
over transmission planning and siting, parochial state concerns will continue to serve as a
barrier to the development of new transmission infrastructure for renewable sources of
electric power.").
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eminent domain power will have on local landowners, and the inefficiencies
and injustices that are likely to accompany it."'
In 2009, members of the House and Senate introduced five separate bills
aiming to increase federal authority over the siting of interstate transmission
lines.13 Each of these bills, while retaining traditional state siting authority to
varying degrees, limits states' discretion in favor of expanding the FERC's
authority. 136 For instance, The National Energy Security Act of 2009
("NESA"), introduced by Senator Byron Dorgan of North Dakota, would
replace the FERC's backstop authority with exclusive siting authority over
facilities included as part of a FERC-designated "interstate extra-high voltage
transmission grid,"'137 deemed the "Clean Energy Superhighway."'3 8 By
taking authority away from those who most directly represent local
landowners and thus are incentivized to give more deference to NIMBY and
environmental interests, such regulations would undoubtedly reduce the
influence of local landowners on the siting of interstate transmission lines. 1
39
NESA does, however, address to some extent concerns regarding
inclusiveness of landowners in the transmission line siting process and the
federal use of eminent domain. While making no substantive changes to
EPAct 2005's eminent domain proceedings, NESA would create a "Siting
Dispute Resolution Board."'140 Though the FERC would eventually specify
how this program would unfold, the bill mandates that the Siting Dispute
Resolution Board would at a minimum "ensure appropriate siting within and
across the borders of the State" 141 NESA would also require a public
hearing open to all interested parties during pre-filing. 1
42
Likewise, the National Clean Superhighways Act of 2009, introduced by
Representative Jay Inslee of Washington, would create Multistate
Transmission Planning Authorities (MTAs) to coordinate in the planning of
134 See Rossi, supra note 5, at 1018-23 (balancing state use of eminent domain for
transmission siting, traditionally more deferential to private property rights, against
federal siting authority, more focused on national energy policy).
135 Beneditti, supra note 9 (reviewing these bills).
136 Id. at 268.
137 NESA, S. 774, 1 11th Cong., § 101 (2009).
138 Id.
139 See Benedetti, supra note 9, at 260 (describing discrepancy between local and
federal authorities' considerations in siting transmission lines).
140 NESA, S. 774, 11 1th Cong. § 101(d)(2)(B)(xi) (2009).
141 Id. § 101(d)(3)(B)(i). One representative of FERC, one state representative, and
another independent expert would comprise the Board. Id. § 101(d)(3)(B)(ii).
142/d. § 101(d)(8)(B)-(C).
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the national transmission grid. 143 This bill would supplement the FERC's
current backstop authority, allowing the MTAs, in coordination with the
FERC, to supersede state siting authority. 144 Notably, this bill calls for "[a]n
open, transparent, and participatory [sustainable transmission grid] planning
process, including public hearings.' 45 Another bill, the American Clean
Energy Leadership Act of 2009 (Senator Jeff Bingaman (NM)) would
mandate that the FERC "shall provide notice to interested persons and
opportunity for hearing.'
146
Senator Ben Nelson's (NE) Sound Management of America's Resources
and Technologies Energy Act ("SMART" Energy Act), lacks public
inclusiveness provisions almost completely. 147 Similarly to NESA, the
SMART Energy Act would create an energy superhighway, over which the
FERC would have exclusive siting authority. 148 While the bill would require
the FERC to consider "input from all interested parties," it does not
specifically discuss how it would account for input from states or from
citizens whose property would be condemned. 149 The SMART Energy Act
authorizes the FERC to use eminent domain in certain circumstances, 150 but
includes no provisions authorizing dispute resolution services or public
hearings.
Each of these bills aims "to address the problem of state and local
governments withholding the power of eminent domain for new transmission
lines."'' 1 By virtue of taking power away from local authorities most likely to
143 NCESA, H.R. 2211, 111 th Cong. § 101 (2009) (amending Part II of the Federal
Power Act).
144 Id. (proposed amendment to § 216A(b)(3) of the Federal Power Act).
145 Id. (proposed amendment to § 216A(b)(1)(B)(ii) of the Federal Power Act).
146 Id. (proposed amendment to § 216(e)(1)(C)(i) of the Federal Power Act).
147 SMART Energy Act, S. 807, 111 th Cong. (2009); see also Benedetti, supra note
9 (comparing the five bills).
148 See SMART Energy Act, supra note 147, § 101 (proposed amendment to §
224(c) of the Federal Power Act).
149 Id. (proposed amendment to § 224(d)(1)(C)(i) of the Federal Power Act); see
also Benedetti, supra note 9, at 263-64 (summarizing SMART Energy Act and its
expansion of FERC's siting jurisdiction).
150 SMART Energy Act, supra note 147, § 101 (proposed amendment to § 224(e)(2)
of the Federal Power Act). This would authorize FERC to use eminent domain for
secondary line connections, defined to include new transmission lines built to connect to
the Energy Superhighway, or existing transmission lines rerouted or otherwise modified
to connect to the Energy Superhighway. Id. (proposed amendment to § 224(b)(5) of the
Federal Power Act).
151 Rossi, supra note 5, at 1039.
[Vol. 26:1 20111
'ENERGIZED' NEGOTIATIONS
account for provincial issues such as private property rights and
environmental considerations, each of these bills would be likely to alienate
local landowners from the siting process. Provisions mandating public
hearings or dispute resolution services, while to an extent mitigating this
problem, do not adequately mitigate disputes arising from eminent domain,
the inefficiencies associated with these disputes, or account for their bearing
on due process.
152
IV. EMINENT DOMAIN REFORM LAWS AND INTEGRATION OF THE
PUBLIC
A. Kelo and the Definition of "Public Use"
With individual states usually retaining their role as final arbiters of
eminent domain power, the issue of whether a given transmission project
represents a bona fide "public use" may increasingly affect eminent domain
grants to private utilities. Even in light of EPAct 2005, states that have
traditionally refused to consider interstate benefits in their siting decisions
may remain unlikely to grant eminent domain to a power company whose
project will primarily benefit citizens of other states.'53 Currently, this is
particularly relevant for the majority of the country that does not fall under
the FERC jurisdiction for the purposes of transmission line siting.154 The
question of the reach of states' eminent domain power has burst into the
public spotlight since the United States Supreme Court's 2005 holding in
Kelo v. City of New London. 155 In Kelo, the Court found the City of New
London's taking of private property to redevelop its waterfront area "to
increase tax and other revenues and to revitalize an economically distressed
city" a legitimate public use, constitutional under the Fifth Amendment.' 
6
This holding, that for a purpose only questionably public, a person's private
152 See infra Part V.
153 Eagle, supra note 58, at 40; see also Rossi, supra note 5, Section II.B.
154 See supra Part III.B.
155 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). See Alexandra B. Klass, The
Frontier of Eminent Domain, 79 U. COLO. L. REv. 651, 652 (2008) (discussing the
emergence of passionate public interest in eminent domain doctrine).
156 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 472, 484.
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property could be condemned and transferred to another owner for
development and private profit, caused a great deal of public outrage.1
57
Within merely two years of the Kelo holding, forty-four states responded
by enacting some form of eminent domain reform legislation, resulting in
possibly more new state legislation than any Supreme Court decision in
history. 58 Critical to much of this legislation was the narrowing of the
framework of what constitutes a permissible public use for eminent domain
purposes. 59 Because the Kelo Court did not impose a bright-line rule over
what constitutes a public purpose consistent with the Fifth Amendment, but
left this authority to local decisionmakers, discrepancies remain across states'
definitions of "public use."' 60
While Kelo brought increased attention and a proliferation of
commentary on the extent to which takings providing private benefits may be
considered "public use," the question of whether the "public" may include
out-of-state residents varies across states. 16 1 State eminent domain reforms
left intact the interstate disparities among states' permission of eminent
domain for transmission projects that would primarily benefit citizens of
neighboring states. 162 As such, while federal backstop permitting has
encouraged states to consider regional benefits in approval of transmission
projects, those states that have been traditionally reluctant to do so may
remain so.
B. Eminent Domain Procedural Reform
In addition to considering the degree to which the public would benefit
from the urban redevelopment project, key to the Kelo Court's decision was
the degree to which the public was integrated into the decisionmaking
157 See Timothy Sandefur, The "Backlash " So Far: Will Americans Get Meaningful
Eminent Domain Reform?, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REv. 709 (2006) (discussing the public
anger and subsequent state reforms arising from Kelo).
158 See also Ilya Somin, The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to
Kelo, 93 MINN. L. REv. 2100, 2101 (2009) (weighing the merits of states' post-Kelo
eminent domain reforms).
159 See National Conference of State Legislatures, Eminent Domain,
http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=l 3252 (last visited Mar. 22, 2010).
160 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 482-83, 483 n. 11 ("[O]ur jurisprudence has recognized that
the needs of society have varied between different parts of the Nation, just as they have
evolved over time in response to changed circumstances.").
161 See generally Rossi, supra note 5, at 1018-23.
162 See generally Eagle, supra note 58.
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process through public hearings, environmental and social reviews, and
alternative analyses. 63 Both the majority opinion and Justice Kennedy's
concurrence underscored the participatory nature of the City of New
London's planning process as evidence that it genuinely served a public
use.' 64 Indeed, commentators have suggested that participatory planning may
help legitimize takings whose public purpose may be otherwise
questionable.
1 65
While much commentary has focused on the eminent domain reform
laws' limitations of the definition of "public use," several of these reforms
have included procedural reform expanding public notice and participatory
requirements as well. 166 For instance, Utah enacted S.B. 317, requiring that
the legislative body in the relevant city or county approve each taking by
vote and that each owner of land subject to condemnation be personally
informed of the meeting and provided the opportunity to be heard.
67
Additionally, condemning entities must make an effort to negotiate with each
property owner in good faith, and advise property owners of rights to
mediation and arbitration'
61
While not all of these reforms have included utilities in their heightened
procedural hurdles, they represent powerful evidence of the consequences of
the public's rising concern for the protection of property rights. Even prior to
Kelo, a number of states' eminent domain procedures already included
requirements of public notice and good faith negotiations, along with such
opportunities for public participation as public hearings. 69 Viewed
163 Klass, supra note 155, at 692-93 (citing Kelo, 545 U.S. at 483-84); see also
Kelo, 545 U.S. at 493 (Kennedy, J., concurring that "[T]he city complied with elaborate
procedural requirements that facilitate review of the record and inquiry into the city's
purposes.").
164 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 483 (majority opinion), 545 U.S. at 493 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
165 Nicole Stelle Garnett, Planning as Public Use?, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 443, 454
(2007) (assessing the potential influence of the Kelo Court's emphasis on participatory
planning on future condemnations).
166 For overview, see Nat'l Conf. of State Legislatures, Eminent Domain,
http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=13252 (last visited Mar. 22, 2010). At least seven
states passed legislation expanding public participation opportunities and mandating good
faith negotiations between 2005 and 2007. Id. For a summary of each of these laws, see
Appendix. See also Somin, supra note 158.
167 UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6-504 (2008).
168 Id. § 78B-6-505.
169 See, e.g., N.Y. EM. DOM. PROC. Law § 101 (McKinney 2006) (The Eminent
Domain Procedure Law's purpose is to "to assure that just compensation shall be paid..
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holistically, Supreme Court precedent from Kelo and the enhanced
participatory requirements present in much state legislation reflect that
increased social and judicial concern has been placed on the integration of
the public in eminent domain proceedings.17
0
C. How Will Recent Eminent Domain Reforms Affect Transmission
Line Siting?
1. Higher Procedural Hurdles in State Laws
In light of Kelo, state legislators have enacted procedural reforms to
eminent domain to give the degree and character of public participation an
increasingly prominent role in the success of condemnations. While courts
have customarily granted utilities substantial deference as to their takings
procedures,17 ' the Kelo opinion and its accompanying legislative backlash
should urge courts to place greater capital into condemnors' integration of
landowners when adjudicating eminent domain cases for transmission line
projects.
In Wyoming, for example, recent eminent domain reform sought to raise
the low bar which electric companies and other condemnors had historically
enjoyed as to their interactions with the public. 172 Like most states, Wyoming
has traditionally been quite hesitant to question electric companies' chosen
routes for transmission lines and the quality of their negotiations with
landowners, as highlighted by its Supreme Court's recent holding in Bridle
Bit Ranch Co. v. Basin Electric Power Cooperative.'73 Here, despite
• to establish [an] opportunity for public participation in the planning of public projects
necessitating the exercise of eminent domain; to give due regard to the need to acquire
property for public use as well as the legitimate interests of private property owners, local
communities and the quality of the environment, and to that end to promote and facilitate
recognition and careful consideration of those interests; to encourage settlement of claims
for just compensation and expedite payments to property owners... and to ensure equal
treatment to all property owners.").
170 See Nasim Farjad, Note, Condemnation Friendly or Land Use Wise? A Broad
Interpretation of The Public Use Requirement Works Well for New York City, 76
FoRDHAM L. REV. 1121 (2007) (arguing that procedural reform, rather than prohibitive
legislation, would best prevent unjust private takings).
171 For review, see Mohr, supra note 44, at 201-02.
172 Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 1-26-509 (2007).
173 Bridle Bit Ranch Co. v. Basin Elec. Power Coop., 118 P.3d 996 (Wyo. 2006)
('[T]he courts have been quite reluctant to overturn a site determination by a power
company unless the evidence clearly established an unreasonable disregard of individual
or public interests.") (citing Annotation, Eminent Domain: Review of Electric Power
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allegations that a company had pre-selected the route of its transmission lines
prior to negotiating it with the landowners, 174 and the fact that Wyoming's
eminent domain law at the time did in fact suggest that condemnors negotiate
in good faith with landowners, the Court quickly dismissed claims that the
condemnor's negotiations failed the good faith standard.1
75
Since Bridle Bit was decided, the Wyoming legislature has amended the
state's eminent domain act to mandate, rather than merely suggest, good faith
negotiations. 176 As part of "good faith negotiations," the new Wyoming
standard includes expanded notice requirements, more rigid timelines, and
orders the condemnors to offer to tour each disputed property with its
respective condemnee. 17 7 While these provisions may not have changed the
outcome in the Bridle Bit case, 178 courts will undoubtedly incorporate the
2007 law's more exacting standards into future condemnation hearings,
allowing landowners earlier and more extensive involvement in the siting
decisions. This mirrors the judicial sentiment favoring enhanced public
participatory proceedings emerging from the Kelo case, 179 as well as recent
trends from state legislatures. 80
Still, the Supreme Court of Wyoming's position with respect to the
power companies' duties as condemnors echoes a sentiment common
throughout U.S. courts, that as nearly per se bona fide vehicles of public use,
utilities generally have more power to infringe upon landowner rights than do
other types of condemnors. 18' As such, some states, while promulgating
restrictive legislation on the use of eminent domain by private entities and
Company's Location of Transmission Line for Which Condemnation is Sought, 19 A.L.R.
4th 1026, 1030-31 (1983 Supp. 2004)).
174 Brief for the Petitioners, Bridle Bit Ranch Company, a Wyoming Corp.; Jerry
and Barbara Dilts Family, 24-25, Bridle Bit Ranch Co. v. Basin Elec. Power Coop., No.
04-134, 2006 WL 3845041.
175 Bridle Bit, 118 P.3d at 1015-16.
176 Wvo. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-26-509(c)-(h) (2007) (specifying a timeline and steps
condemnors must follow to satisfy the good faith requirement). For comprehensive
review of changes, see 2007 Wyoming Laws Ch. 139 (H.B. 124).
1771d. §§ 1-26-509 (c)-(h) (2007).
178 In Bridle Bit, the power company had been negotiating with some landowners
for over a year, and by the day of trial had settled with approximately 82% of them. The
company also kept extensive records of its negotiations with all landowners. Bridle Bit,
118 P.3d at 998, 1015-16.
179 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 483 (majority opinion), 545 U.S. at 493 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
180 See supra note 106.
181 See generally Mohr, supra note 44.
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subjecting them to increased procedural requirements, have exempted public
utilities in these laws. For instance, Minnesota's eminent domain law
requires that a condemning authority provide both public and individual
notice of its proposed taking and "make a good faith attempt to negotiate
personally with the owner of the property in order to acquire the property by
direct purchase instead of the use of eminent domain proceedings."'' 82
However, as "public service corporations," gas and electric utilities are
exempt from these expanded public participatory requirements, thus enjoying
greater judicial deference than would the majority of takers. 183
Many states have, nonetheless, made steps toward public inclusiveness in
procedures for condemnation for the construction of transmission lines.
Missouri's reform, for example, subjects utilities, along with all potential
condemning entities, to identical public notice and good faith negotiation
requirements. 84 Likewise, Utah's law implicates nearly every conceivable
taker, including those constructing "electric light and power lines, and sites
for electric light and power plants," in its procedural requirements that
property owners be given ample notice, the opportunity to be heard at a
public meeting, and negotiation in good faith.'85
Georgia's reform, however, represents the most direct result of public
dissatisfaction with the manner in which some public utilities exercise their
takings power. 86 In response to "the perceived arrogance on the part of the
utilities in taking land," Georgia enacted H.B. 373, implementing increased
procedural hurdles specifically for utilities in condemning property to build
power lines. 187 This law requires that, in siting transmission lines, Georgia
utilities negotiate in good faith with each affected property owner and hold a
number of public meetings where they provide information about the lines,
show alternative routes they considered, and provide an opportunity for
public comment.' 88 Enacted even prior to Kelo, this law provides evidence
both that discontent with condemnation power extends well beyond private
182 S.F. No. 2750, 84th Sess. (Minn. 2006). Notice requirements are in MNN. STAT.
§ 117.055 (2006). Negotiation provisions are found in MINN. STAT. § 117.036 (2006).
183 MINN. STAT. § 117.025(10) (2010) (defining public service corporation); id. §
117.189 (exempting these entities from notice and negotiation requirements).
184 Mo. REV. STAT. § 523.256 (2006).
185 UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6-501 (2008).
186 See Sarah Elizabeth Tosone, Condemnation Procedures: Change The Time For
Hearing Before A Special Master And To..., 21 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 157 (2004) (discussing
the passage of Georgia H.B. 373).
187 GA. CODE ANN. § 22-3-160(a) (2010).
188 Id.
[Vol. 26:1 20111
'ENERGIZED' NEGOTIATIONS
development takings, and that this tension may be in part offset by better
integration of the public." 9 In addition to providing more procedural hurdles
requisite for condemnation, laws such as these bring increased public
scrutiny to the taking process, thereby deterring condemnors from using their
takings power in any way that the public could view as callous. 190
However, commentators have argued that the increased due process and
procedural justice sought by many post-Kelo reforms will not occur. In fact,
of the forty-four total state reforms, a recent article classified only twenty as
truly providing "property owners with at least some significant protection
against economic-development condemnations beyond that available under
preexisting law."' 9' While that article limited the scope of its discussion to
economic-development takings, it powerfully illustrates many of these
reforms' failure to provide meaningful change. The article characterizes
several of these reforms aimed to better integrate the public as only "minor
procedural protections" that fail to alter what are essentially unjust takings. 192
Rather bluntly, another commentator has argued that "insulating an injustice
with bureaucratic procedural requirements simply cannot transform it into a
just act."' 93 Ultimately, while enhanced public participatory procedures may
in some cases increase due process and procedural justice, the consistency
with which such reforms may actually effectuate these goals remains
uncertain.
2. Potential Effects of EPAct 2005 on States' Scrutiny
While Kelo-era state eminent domain reform laws have given increased
attention to landowners' roles in condemnation proceedings, federal
intervention under EPAct 2005 will further complicate this picture. On one
hand, via the Act's requirement that condemnors implement Public
Participation Plans meant to maximize the information made available to
landowners and their opportunities to participate, the FERC has made clear
189 Tosone, supra note 186, at 164.
190 Gregory S. Knapp, Note, Maintaining Government Accountability: Calls for a
"Public Use'" Beyond Eminent Domain, 83 IND. L.J. 1097, 1115 (2008).
191 Ilya Somin, The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to Kelo, 93
MINN. L. REV. 2100,2114 (2009).
192 Id. at 2131 (describing Delaware's reform bill, codified at DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
29, § 9501A (2009)).
193 Sandefur, supra note 157, at 731.
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that it intends to improve the public's integration in the condemnation
process. 94
On the other hand, much evidence calls into question the degree to which
this ideal will be implemented in practice. First, any analysis of this issue
must emphasize the fact that, like the NGA, the very purpose of EPAct 2005
was to foster a legal atmosphere facilitative to the efficient siting of energy
projects, especially to projects that transcend state boundaries. 9
Consequently, there is compelling reason to expect that by and large, the
FERC will administer takings for both electric and gas lines similarly.
96
Under the NGA, utilities holding the FERC's blanket certificates have
generally enjoyed deference from courts in eminent domain decisions.' 97 The
FERC's public integration practices historically employed under the NGA,
while in some cases successful in giving voice to members of the public, are
unlikely to effectively integrate these views into actual decisions. 98 Instead,
the process merely gathers opinion without facilitating consensus-building. 99
Regardless, because the FERC holds only backstop jurisdiction, it thus
200far has seldom played a direct role in the transmission line siting process.
However, as investment in transmission infrastructure continues to increase,
so does the likelihood that local property interests will conflict with
nationwide energy goals, thus providing impetus for FERC to wield its
jurisdictional power. Rather than direct intervention, however, "the mere
threat of federal preemption may influence states' behavior by inducing them
194 18 C.F.R. § 50.4 (2009).
195 Swanstrom & Jolivert, supra note 11, at 452.
196 Id. The FPA does include some minor specifications providing tighter control
over the takings process than is present under the NGA. For example, while the NGA
provides no specific standard to determine the amount of compensation to be paid
landowners, the FPA specifies that, "[J]ust compensation shall be an amount equal to the
fair market value (including applicable severance damages) of the property taken on the
date of the exercise of eminent domain authority." 16 U.S.C. § 824p(f)(2) (2006).
However, given these Acts' similar purpose, commentators have concluded that their
actual takings processes will be generally similar. See Swanstrom & Jolivert, supra note
11, at 454.
197 See generally supra Part II.
198 Jonathon Raab & Lawrence Susskind, New Approaches to Consensus Building
and Speeding up Large-Scale Energy Infrastructure Projects 5, http://web.mit.edu/dusp/
epp/pdfs/NewApproachesConsensusBuilding.pdf (last visited Mar. 25, 2010).
199 Id.
200 Swanstrom & Jolivert, supra note 11, at 466.
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to approve more projects or act more quickly on applications., 20 Further, the
chorus of calls for amendment to EPAct 2005 to expand FERC's siting
power may increase the tension between states' concern for local property
interests and national energy policy goals.20 2
With disparate state eminent domain procedures in place, the ultimate
effect that increased investment in electric transmission will have on
individual landowners remains to be seen. For instance, one can only
speculate as to how the looming FERC power will affect states whose
traditional permitting of transmission lines was rooted in parochialism. 20 3 It is
similarly unclear how FERC's power will affect states whose procedures as
to landowner involvement in condemnation proceedings has not been made
explicit, as well as how FERC's background presence will affect district
courts' construction of states' newly heightened procedural requirements. A
distinct possibility is that states reluctant to turn over jurisdiction to FERC
may be incentivized to approve projects on their own.204 Thus, in spite of an
array of state provisions aimed to protect landowners from unjust takings, the
multitude of factors playing into state transmission sitings leaves these
landowners' procedural roles and rights uncertain.
V. THE IDEAL PUBLIC ROLE IN THE SITING OF TRANSMISSION LINES:
BALANCING JUSTICE AND EXPEDIENCE
Upon taking office, President Obama assured the American people that
his Presidency would usher in an era of "transparency and open
government., 20 5 Via public memorandum, Obama instructed agency leaders
206
that government should be transparent, participatory, and collaborative.
While this goal is commendable in the abstract, this may be difficult to
implement in practice. The siting of interstate transmission facilities,
however, offers an opportune context to engage the public to sufficiently
201 Id. at 457. Note however, that FERC may not reverse a state agency's outright
denial of a siting application. Piedmont Envntl. Council v. F.E.R.C., 558 F.3d 304, 313-
14 (4th Cir. 2009).
202 See supra Part II.C.
203 Again, states may not consider out-of-state benefits in determining whether a
project meets the public use requirement for the exercise of eminent domain. See Eagle,
supra note 58, at 25.
204 Id.
205 Memorandum on Transparency and Open Government, 74 Fed. Reg. 4685 (Jan.
21, 2009).
206 Id.
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address the Obama ideal. Such a process, able to improve the quality of
decisions made and help legitimize the expansion of federal jurisdiction,
must be designed so as to avoid inefficiencies associated with excessive
public integration.
To successfully modernize the national electric transmission grid,
regulators must account for the effects of its expansion on landowners whose
property it will cross. To do so, Congress should amend EPAct 2005 to
improve the FERC's integration of the public through consensus-building
procedures: bringing procedural justice to landowners affected by the
construction of interstate transmission lines, while at the same time creating a
more efficient siting process.
To best accomplish these potentially conflicting goals, Congress should
create a program encouraging public participation in siting proceedings, but
primarily via neutral third-party mediators. Broadly defined, mediation is a
process by which a neutral third person facilitates interested parties in
arriving at a mutually acceptable solution to a controversy. 20 7 Such a program
would be able to accommodate any pending broader revisions of the current
protocol for siting interstate transmission lines.208 Mediation has been highly
successful when applied to land use disputes, so much so that one study
reported 86% of those participating in mediated land use dispute resolution
processes reacting to it favorably, with 85% believing that the mediator
played a critical role in contributing to the process's success. 209 In addition to
increasing participants' satisfaction, mediated land use agreements are also
likely to be more efficient than traditional alternatives. For instance, the study
also found that 91% of participants, including government officials, reported
that the process cost less, and 81% stated that the process took less time than
more adversarial, conventional alternatives. 10
In authorizing mediation, Congress should require that any utility siting a
transmission line under federal jurisdiction first hold at least one public
hearing in each county where the transmission line would be located,
allowing all members of the public the opportunity to comment. 211 This
public hearing should take place early on, contemplating integration of the
2 0 7 JOHN R. NOLON, WELL GROUNDED: USING LOCAL LAND USE AUTHORITY TO
ACHIEVE SMART GROwTH 429 (Evntl. Law Inst.200 1).
208 See supra Part I.C (discussing pending amendments to EPAct 2005).
209 LAWRENCE SUSSKIND, OLE AMUNDSEN & MASAHIRO MATSUURA, USING
ASSISTED NEGOTIATION TO SETTLE LAND USE DISPUTES: A GUIDEBOOK FOR PUBLIC
OFFICIALS 3 (1999).
210Id. at 19-23.
211 See GA. CODE ANN. § 22-3-160-162 (2004).
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public as early as possible in the planning process.' 12 Further, EPAct 2005
should be amended to require that utilities attempt to conduct good faith
negotiations with landowners before engaging in any eminent domain
proceedings.213 Congress should similarly require affected landowners to
attempt to negotiate with the utility in good faith.2 14 Finally, Congress should
allow landowners to initiate mediation by request at any time during
215deliberations. For the common situation in which multiple landowners
share identical interests, the FERC should allow the utility to consolidate
landowners' claims for the purposes of siting negotiations and deliberations,
with a third-party neutral acting as mediator on behalf of both parties.
216
Such a program would give a genuine voice to landowners similarly
affected by the siting of interstate transmission facilities, without impeding
planners' practical need for expedience. This procedure would provide a
number of benefits to the siting process, potentially improving the quality of
deliberations, conferring increased legitimacy on an otherwise undemocratic
process, and a quicker, more satisfactory means of resolving disputes.
A. Public Participation Can Improve the Quality of the
Decisionmaking Process
Public participation allows agencies to better understand affected
citizens' preferences.217 When members of the public are genuinely involved
in agency decisionmaking, as opposed to playing the role of outside
commentators, decisionmakers are encouraged to "actually listen" to their
viewpoints.218 An integrative process, in addition to voicing their personal
preferences, broadens the scope of information available to
212 Raab & Susskind, supra note 198, at 8.
213 For an overview of states' requirements that would-be condemnors must adhere
to, see Appendix.
214 For example, Wyoming's eminent domain law requires that "[a] condemnee
shall make reasonable and diligent efforts to negotiate in good faith with the condemnor
including a timely written response to the written offer [by the utility to purchase his
land] specifying areas of disagreement." WYo. STAT. ANN. § 1-26-509(c)(iii)(f) (2007).
215 Both Wyoming's and Utah's eminent domain laws contain such provisions.
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-26-509(h) (2007); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6-522 (2008).
216 See infra Part V (describing this procedure).
217 jim Rossi, Participation Run Amok: The Costs of Mass Participation for
Deliberative Agency Decisionmaking, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 173, 185 (1997) (weighing costs
and benefits of public participation in agency decisionmaking).
218 Id.
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decisionmakers. 219 Agencies, often criticized for acting too hastily and
without enough information, may in some contexts be able to ameliorate this
challenge by broadening their information base.22 ° Of course, public
participation allows information not only to flow from citizens to
decisionmakers, but to the wider public as well.22' Consequently, a better-
informed public may be able to cooperate with public officials more
222
effectively, facilitating a more efficient decisionmaking process.
With respect to the siting of interstate transmission facilities, a siting
process consisting solely of experts may be unable to accurately assess
landowner value judgments. For instance, while experts may be able to
precisely pinpoint health risks that transmission lines pose to residents, they
are unlikely to satisfactorily account for citizens' less technical objections,
such as aesthetic concerns, degree of decline in property value, or concern
that the neighborhood could become a future brownfield.223 Members of the
public may be able to fill the gaps that information provided solely by
utilities would inevitably leave.224 Thus, integration of affected landowners
into the decisionmaking process would allow officials to better account for
their preferences-a consideration that should in any event weigh heavily on
the siting process.
B. Public Participation will Help Legitimize the Expansion of Federal
Jurisdiction over the Siting of Transmission Lines
A Department of Energy-commissioned study of the national electric
grid described the public trust in the transmission siting process as "crucial
and volatile" to its success, exhorting managers of the process to act in a
manner to maintain the public's confidence.225 Greater integration of the
public would help to achieve this end by making agency decisionmaking
more accountable to the public and subject to institutional oversight.226
Particularly in the federal system, agencies are not directly linked to any
219 Id. at 186.
220 Id.
221 Id. at 187.
222 Rossi, supra note 218, at 187.
223 Id. at 198.
224 Meyer & Sedano, supra note 12, at E-3.
225 Id. at E-6.
226 Rossi, supra note 217, at 182-83.
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majoritarian political process because their officials are unelected.227 When
these officials oversee the government taking of privately owned land, this
creates a unique challenge to the democratic ideal, as landowners have little
influence, practically or even theoretically, over their appointment. The
widespread push for increased accountability and public participation
opportunities in state eminent domain procedures evidences citizens' desires
to be involved in decisions relating to their property and communities.2
Using eminent domain only as the last resort, and attempting to first
engage the public in participatory planning, often avoids the need for
condemnation, and lends it legitimacy when it does occur.2 2 9 Literature
suggests that this "legitimacy benefit" already occurs when applied to
regulatory negotiations under the Environmental Protection Agency.230 Here,
empirical studies have found that public participation reduces conflict and
yields increased satisfaction from participants in both the procedure and
results of collaborative rulemaking. 2 1
A citizen who faces a government condemnation of his land, supervised
by a federal agency, and primarily for the benefit of citizens of a neighboring
state, is naturally likely to perceive the taking as unjust. Since the Kelo
decision and in light of states' eminent domain reform laws, courts in many
states may be similarly hesitant to authorize eminent domain under such
circumstances. However, the Kelo Court did suggest that "public,
participatory planning is a constitutional safe harbor" lending legitimacy to
takings and thus protecting condemning entities from some challenges by
landowners.232 With respect to economic development takings, municipal
governments are more likely than ever before to design comprehensive and
participatory planning efforts to avoid conflict with state eminent domain
227 Id.
228 See supra Part 1V.B.
229 Garnett, supra note 165, at 461-65.
230 Id. at 463-64 (reviewing literature). See Jody Freeman & Laura I. Langbein,
Regulatory Negotiation and the Legitimacy Benefit, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 60, 62, 67, 80,
109-10 (2000) (discussing comprehensive study of EPA's negotiated rulemaking
process, which found that negotiations reduce conflict and increase participant
satisfaction and commitment to results).
231 Freeman & Langbein, supra note 230.
232 Garnett, supra note 165, at 444; see also Meyer & Sedano, supra note 12, at E-
S1 (stating that parties other than utilities are more likely to feel that an open or
transparent siting process has respected their interests).
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reform laws.233 Utilities, however, have not historically been inclined to
genuinely allow the citizenry much influence over their siting decisions.234 In
light of the FERC's impending increased jurisdiction over the transmission
siting process, and thus its likely decline in legitimacy in the public eye, a
participatory planning process should similarly help avoid conflict with more
parochial state laws. 235 Even in cases where the FERC is subordinate to state-
level jurisdiction, a FERC practice requiring public participation would
incentivize utilities to integrate landowners, in anticipation of utilizing
FERC's backstop jurisdiction later on.236 Thus, federally administered
participatory planning would raise the federal siting process's legitimacy,
helping to hedge against disparities in state eminent domain laws.
C. The Public Should Not Be Integrated in a Manner that Would
Impede the Efficiency of the Decisionmaking Process
Critics have long argued that the process for siting transmission lines
"has become unnecessarily cumbersome, delay prone, and subject to
breakdown"-a concern particularly apposite for lines crossing state
boundaries. 237 As such, if taken to excess, broad public integration may both
delay and hamper the quality of agency decisions. 38 Beyond mere
inclusiveness, a fundamental goal of participatory proceedings is to raise the
quality of discussion and decisions.239 While public participation encourages
breadth in decisionmaking procedure, it may in some cases discourage the
233 Brandon Simmons, Kelo's Planning Mandate: Replacing Clarity with
Complication, 43 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 139, 167 (2008) (arguing that judicial
requirements of public participatory planning will add confusion to takings jurisprudence,
because it will require courts to examine complicated, political areas in which they have
little expertise).
234 Mohr, supra note 44, at 201-02.
235 For an example of this process leading to a successful siting of interstate
transmission lines, see Meyer & Sedano, supra note 12, at E-32 n.38. Here, Meyer and
Sedano describe how the Kansas Corporation Commission approved a segment of a
transmission project despite its lack of benefit to Kansas, based upon an open
participatory process. Id.
236 Swanstrom & Jolivert, supra note 11, at 457.
237 Meyer & Sedano, supra note 12, at E-1.
238 See generally Rossi, supra note 217, at 212-37 (exploring the relationship
between the breadth of public participation and the quality of deliberation).
239 Id.
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deep deliberation necessary for high quality decisions.240 Thus, designers of
any siting process seeking to further integrate landowners must be careful to
ensure that doing so will neither reduce its efficiency or quality.
For one, an influx of angry landowners into siting proceedings may
impair decisionmakers' abilities to discuss items without fearing backlash
from the public, forcing superficial or disingenuous discussion.24 Further,
additional stakeholders are likely to bring a greater quantity, though not
necessarily quality, of information, potentially leading to an "information
overload" that would encourage a less thorough analyses of issues and
242alternatives. Similarly, a greater number of participants would surely, at
least in some cases, lead to redundancies in information discussed, and thus
to inefficiency.243 Further still, the scope of these projects, many of which
would pass through multiple states, renders wholly integrative
decisionmaking simply impossible.244 Because doing so would be
impractical, and in any event not advantageous, FERC's procedural structure
should not allow all affected landowners to participate directly.
However, an improved integration of the public would facilitate higher
quality decisionmaking as well as more efficient resolution of disputes. 45
Utilities' failures to appropriately address disputes have in many cases
resulted in substantial delays, and sometimes failures, to site transmission
projects.246 While federal assertion of jurisdiction over the siting of interstate
projects will in some cases help expedite the siting process, any process that
fails to address the concerns of affected landowners will be subject to similar
difficulties. 247 In contrast, a recent government study found open planning,
240 Id.
241 Id. at 216.
242 Id.
243 Id.
244 Lebeck, supra note 116, at 255-56 (discussing the balance of local and national
interests in the decionmaking process for locating liquid natural gas terminals under
EPAct 2005).
245 Alejandro Esteban Camacho, Mustering the Missing Voices: A Collaborative
Model for Fostering Equality, Community Involvement and Adaptive Planning in Land
Use Decisions Installment Two, 24 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 269, 271 (2005) (arguing that
participatory planning may generate fairer, better planned, and more efficient land use
agreements). See also NOLON, supra note 207, at 430 (stating that early use of mediation
can prevent disputes, while later use can resolve them).
246 Eagle, supra note 58, at 25.
247 Id. at 25-26 n. 208 (citing cases where local anger hampered the siting process).
See also supra Part [IL
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with utilities soliciting interested parties' views early on, a "critical element
of success. '248 For instance, a case study examining a four-state transmission
siting found "the applicant's proactive anticipation of and responsiveness to
landowner and community concerns" essential to its success. 24 9 To be
effective, however, utilities should not merely inform landowners of their
plans, but rather should seek to settle issues and reach consensus.25 °
To successfully move beyond stagnant deliberation and toward
consensus-building, all parties would benefit from the use of mediation.251
Such a mechanism, allowing but forcing limits on participation, would
encourage representative, deliberative decisionmaking while avoiding
inefficiencies inherent in indiscriminate, immediate participation. 2  As
outlined below, mediation would successfully balance the government's goal
of streamlining the siting of interstate transmission facilities, while yielding
just, high quality decisions.
VI. A LANDOWNER-UTILITY MEDIATION MODEL
A. Normative Characteristics of the Mediation Model
A FERC-supervised program where landowners and utilities can resolve
disputes regarding the construction of interstate transmission facilities
through mediation would provide greater justice and efficiency than the
FERC's current procedure. Mediation could resolve a number of difficulties
extant in the present system where federal permitting is at odds with state
eminent domain powers.253 Given the heightened attention to eminent domain
brought by the Supreme Court's decision in Kelo, disparate state procedural
requirements, and the sheer number of property owners implicated in
interstate projects, condemnation processes under EPAct 2005 will often be
extremely protracted. 4 If enacted, current proposals for further expansion of
FERC's authority are not likely to resolve this difficulty, but rather to lead to
248 Meyer & Sedano, supra note 12, at E-I 1.
249Id. at E-10 (discussing Xcel Energy's building of a 300-mile, 345 kv line
connecting a substation in Amarillo, Texas to a substation near Lamar, Colorado).
250 Raab & Susskind, supra note 198, at 15.
251 Id.
252 Rossi, supra note 217, at 245.
253 Eagle, supra note 58, at 38.
254 David B. MacGregor & Matthew J. Agen, Shortcut or Short Circuit:
Transmission Line Siting Under EPAct, PuB. UTIL. FORTNIGHTLY, Aug. 2007, at 42.
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even heavier use of eminent domain, potentially unleashing public backlash
against these takings. Structured effectively, a federally-authorized mediation
process would increase both due process to landowners and efficiency in the
siting process.
To be successful, any multilateral land use dispute resolution model
should present clear advantages to FERC's current model. To do so, the
mediation model should afford landowners the ability to participate in a
meaningful way, through a collaborative problem-solving orientation.
1. The Need for Meaningful Participation
While the FERC's process does currently mandate the inclusion of
interested landowners in the siting of interstate transmission lines, it does not
do so early enough or through procedure likely to lead to meaningful
involvement. As such, it fails to grant landowners the "opportunity to be
heard ... at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner" that is necessary
to fulfill due process. 5 Generally speaking, utilities will only allow public
involvement because doing so is required by law, and will attempt to do the
least possible in order to satisfy the legal standard.256 This approach, rather
than fostering the participatory government envisioned by President
Obama,257 will "rarely afford interested parties any meaningful participation
in negotiating specifics of large-scale developments.,
258
Instead, landowners should, through mediation, have a meaningful role
in determining how the transmission project unfolds. To accomplish this,
affected landowners should be notified and integrated "once a need has been
recognized but before a solution is selected., 259 Utilities should present
landowners with alternatives to their desired projects, and attempt to
illustrate that they intend to complete the project in the best way possible,
255 Denver Welfare Rights Org. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 547 P.2d 239, 247 (Colo.
1976) (en banc).
256 Raab & Susskind, supra note 198, at 10.
257 Memorandum on Transparency and Open Government, supra note 205.
258 Alejandro Esteban Camacho, Mustering the Missing Voices: A Collaborative
Model for Fostering Equality, Community Involvement, and Adaptive Planning in Land
Use Decisions Installment One, 24 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 37-38 (citing Daniel R.
Mandelker, LAND USE LAW 2-51 (5th ed. 2003)).
259 Meyer & Sedano, supra note 12, at E-32.
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rather than simply focusing on getting a particular project completed.2 60 A
wide array of options would be discussed, and members of the public would
be able to be involved throughout the process. Allowing the public to
understand and provide input as to the relative merits of alternative projects
would dramatically increase the substance of public participation, currently
in need of improvement.26'
2. A Collaborative, Problem-Solving Orientation
To best facilitate consensus, public participation must take place
cooperatively, rather than adversarially.262 Under the FERC's jurisdiction,
utilities have a long history of protracted disputes with landowners and
reliance on condemnation to acquire property.263 While the FERC has
included provisions mandating increased integration of the public under
EPAct 2005, such provisions are unlikely to change the basic character of the
siting process, which is fundamentally hostile to private property interests.264
Legislation currently in committee in both houses of Congress that would
require utilities to hold public hearings prior to siting transmission lines
under federal jurisdiction similarly would do very little to change the essence
of interstate transmission sitings.265 Moreover, broader energy reform
legislation currently being debated is likely to emphasize expedience over
266private property rights to an even greater extent.
260 Id. Texas, for example, requires that utilities submit alternative route options, in
addition to the usefulness of demand-side management and distributed generation as
opposed to the construction of new lines. Id. at E-5 n.9.
261 Raab & Susskind, supra note 198, at 7.
262 See generally SUsAN L. CARPENTER & W.J.D. KENNEDY, MANAGING PUBLIC
DISPUTES: A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR GOVERNMENT, BUSINESS, AND CITIZENS' GROUPS 27
(2001) (providing guidance for conflict resolution processes in the public arena).
263 See generally Mohr, supra note 44 (discussing disputes between landowners and
utilities under the NGA).
264 Speaking generally, any interaction between private property owners and
developers seeking to condemn their land is presumably quite hostile. Erik Stock, "We
Were All Born on It. And Some of Us Was Killed on It": Adopting a Transformative
Model in Eminent Domain Mediation, 23 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 687, 701 (2008)
(advocating the use of transformative mediation for resolving eminent domain disputes).
265 S. 32, 111th Cong. (2009) (introduced Jan. 6); H.R. 1922, 111th Cong. (2009)
(introduced Apr. 2).
266 See supra Part I1I.C (discussing pending energy reform bills and their failure to
protect landowners from expanded federal jurisdiction over the siting of interstate
transmission lines).
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Mediation, in contrast, would seek to change the basic outlook of both
utilities and landowners in the siting process. Mediation is able to change the
basic character of siting disputes, containing the "unique potential for
transforming conflict interaction and, as a result, changing the mindset of
people who are involved in the process. 2 67 Rather than viewing the conflict
as a battle to be won, the mediation process would encourage participants to
ask: "How can we solve the problem? ' 268 Representative parties meet face to
face and openly discuss the range of concerns, agree on relevant facts, create
options, develop criteria for choice, and aim to make decisions on which they
could all agree. 269 Seeking to remove the adversarial, zero-sum mindset
inherent in eminent domain litigation, the mediation program could
concurrently mitigate many of the injustices and inefficiencies associated
with condemnation.
B. Overview of the Recommended Mediation Process
1. Regional Transmission Organizations Would Oversee
Negotiations
To address Congress's concern that state siting boards often favor
parochial interests related directly to their constituencies over national energy
goals, regional boards should be created to balance local with national
concerns. While state and local governments have opposed such a shift,
claiming that greater regionalization or nationalization of transmission siting
would trivialize concerns of local communities,271 the use of mediation
would satisfy these concerns. While it is beyond the scope of this paper to
recommend in detail the interplay between state, regional, and national
regulatory siting bodies, nearly all of the energy reform legislation pending
267 ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION
65-66 (rev. ed. 2005) (advocating a "transformative" model of mediation, which seeks to
give parties empowerment and recognition, and thereby helps them to resolve their
current conflicts).
268 CARPENTER & KENNEDY, supra note 262, at 27.
269 Id.
270 Stock, supra note 264, at 695.
271 Eagle, supra note 58, at 24 (providing overview of states' objections to any
changes that would divest them of siting authority).
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before Congress suggests increasing regionalization,272 and most experts
have similarly called for such a shift.273 As such, any revision to EPAct 2005
is most likely to rely on regionalized transmission organizations. With
expanded federal jurisdiction over the siting of interstate transmission
facilities, these regional bodies would be best suited to balance local and
national interests,274 and thus would be charged with overseeing the process
of negotiations and mediation between landowners and transmission
developers.
2. The Public Hearing and Good Faith Negotiation Requirements
Developers seeking to build interstate transmission facilities should be
required to hold at least one public hearing in each county in which such
facilities would be located, allowing all members of the public the
opportunity to comment.275 Companies should be required to provide
adequate public notice prior to these meetings, allowing for broad inclusion
276to facilitate due process for all affected landowners.
Additionally, any amendment to EPAct 2005 should require that utilities
negotiate in good faith with property owners.277 This provision should
explicitly provide what constitutes good faith negotiations, giving all parties
clear notification of their statutory duties.278 Utilities should be encouraged to
272 See Benedetti, supra note 9, at 261-68 (providing overview of pending energy
reform legislation). Only the SMART Energy Act would not create regional siting
entities. S. 108, 111 th Cong. (2009). This bill would create an Energy Superhighway,
governed exclusively by FERC. Id. § 101 (proposing amendment to § 224(c)(2) of the
Federal Power Act).
273 See Eagle, supra note 58, at 40 n.328 (citing articles that recommend
regionalization).
274 Id. at 43. Such entities, including the Bonneville Power Administration,
Tennessee Valley Authority, and regional offices of the Environmental Protection
Agency, have historically been very responsive to local concerns. Meyer & Sedano,
supra note 12, at E-21.
275 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 22-3-160.1 (2005); see also S. 32, 111th Cong.
(2009); H.R. 1922, 111 th Cong. (2009).
276 GA. CODE ANN. § 22-3-160.1 (2005).
277 To see several state laws that require good faith negotiations prior to
condemnation see Appendix.
278 For example, good faith negotiations under Wyoming's eminent domain law
include providing written details about the project and property sought, information about
the condemnor, an initial written offer to purchase the land from the potential
condemnee, an estimate of the property's fair market value, an offer to tour the property
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initiate such negotiations as early as possible, preferably as soon as the need
for transmission facilities is recognized.279 In doing so, stakeholders would be
engaged in an open planning process, working with the utility to consider the
interests of all parties in the siting.280 Such engagement would often be most
effective via a neutral third-party mediator.
3. Requesting Mediation
At any time during negotiation, either party should have the right to
request mediation. 8 Importantly, mediation would be required only upon
request of either party. Depending on the circumstances, either side would
have incentive to request mediation. Landowners would, for example, be
incentivized to use mediators to help them clearly articulate their concerns,
and through connecting their personal concerns to those of their community,
to give these concerns greater weight.282 Utilities would likewise be
incentivized in many cases to request mediation, as the process would
condense grievances of multiple landowners into one coherent voice, both
improving their abilities to respond to landowner concerns and allowing
them to do so more efficiently.283
Individual property valuations aside, it is likely that many affected
landowners will share similar or identical concerns about interstate
transmission projects. In these cases, utilities should retain the option to
move to consolidate these cases for the purposes of mediation. Under these
circumstances, landowners with identical interests would select
representatives empowered to speak for them as a group.284 Here, any
with condemnee and offer to discuss relevant issues. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-26-509
(2007).
279 Meyer & Sedano, supra note 12, at E-32.
280 Id.
281 See, e.g., WYo. STAT. ANN. § 1-26-509(h) (2007).
282 Juliana E. Birkhoff & Kern Lowry, Whose Reality Counts?, in THE PROMISE AND
PERFORMANCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION 27, 28-31 (Rosemary
O'Leary & Lisa Bingham eds., 2003). As benefits of mediation in the environmental
context, the authors cite mediators' abilities to advocate for parties, and to increase
"social capital," or the ability to draw upon relationship networks to empower
communities.
283 Camacho, supra note 245, at 307 (explaining how collaborative land use
agreements may decrease costs when used in place of bilateral negotiations).
284 Rossi, supra note 217, at 246 (discussing the optimal use of public participation
to advance democracy and enhance the quality of deliberation).
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landowner unsatisfied with representation and wanting to participate
individually would carry the burden of proving either that the representatives
are inadequate or that the landowner has an interest distinct from those
already represented.285 Because the costs of individualized participation are
often excessive in light of the benefits they provide to either party, such an
approach would provide a satisfactory balance between the need for
procedural justice and the expedience sought in recent transmission siting
legislation.286 Importantly, consolidation could only occur after public
hearings had been held, so that each landowner would have the opportunity
to voice his or her unique concerns, thereby also making the case for
individualized involvement. Although such an approach will in many cases
not allow each individual landowner to directly participate in the mediation,
this approach would most likely yield the highest-quality negotiations, in the
most efficient manner practicable.287
4. Selecting a Mediator
Each regional siting board should maintain a database providing names
of individuals qualified to meditate these disputes, though mediators should
288
come from outside the FERC or any stakeholding organizations. Because
siting processes tend to be highly technical in nature, the FERC should
require that mediators be adept at handling these technical issues.2 89 Many
state-level land use mediation programs require that mediators have expertise
in land use planning and regulatory processes, as well as more general
mediation qualifications. 290 Utilizing a mediator with substantial knowledge
of both transmission infrastructure and the land use planning process will
allow all parties to take advantage of the neutral's practical knowledge of the
285 Id.
286 Id. at 194. Upon realizing that their interests are being adequately represented,
parties are likely to take a less active role in the process voluntarily. Camacho, supra note
245, at 308.
287 Raab & Susskind, supra note 198, at 10-11; Rossi, supra note 217, at 244.
288 Michael L. Poirier Elliot, The Role of Facilitators, Mediators, and Other
Consensus Building Practicioners, in THE CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK 199, 235
(Lawrence Susskind, Sarah McKeaman & Jennifer Thomas-Larmer eds., 1999).
289 EDWARD CHRISTIE, FINDING SOLUTIONS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICTS:
POWER AND NEGOTIATION 279 (2008).
290 Matthew McKinney, Patrick Field & Sarah Bates, Responding to Streams of
Land Use Disputes: A Systems Approach, 60 PLANNING & ENVTL. L. 3, 5 (2008)
(Colorado, Idaho, and Vermont laws all include this mandate).
260
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feasibility of proposed alternatives, ability to offer creative solutions of his or
her own, and experience in mediating disputes of a similar nature.
While the regional transmission organization may recommend mediators,
the law should require that both landowners and utilities approve the
mediator.291 Joint selection of the mediator, as opposed to the siting board
unilaterally appointing one, will avoid alienating any party and help induce
cooperation from the outset. To avoid unnecessary delays, however, parties
should be given a fixed time limit to agree on the mediator, after which the
board could appoint one.
5. Issues to be Discussed
To be most meaningful, negotiations should be open to discussion of any
issues.292 These include, but are not limited to, landowners' concerns about
losing their property rights, mitigation of the transmission facilities' potential
adverse affects on property values, and mitigation of potential environmental
or health risks. 293 By integrating stakeholders early in the siting process, these
landowners will also be able to play a role in weighing the need for the
facilities and the merits of potential alternatives. 94 If and when landowners
accept the fact that the facilities must be built, discussions should focus on
understanding what impacts are likely to occur, and how to best minimize
them. 2
95
The use of a technically-knowledgeable mediator will be crucial, as
parties are likely to disagree on the effects of transmission facilities and
general need for them. Where technical issues are beyond the mediator's
expertise, assistance from outside experts may be permitted.296 Although the
use of 'dueling outside experts' could produce some antagonism between
parties, the early inclusion of parties and encouragement of good faith
agreements should to some extent lessen this risk.
291 Elliot, supra note 288, at 235.
292 Raab & Susskind, supra note 198, at 12.
293 Id.
294 Meyer & Sedano, supra note 12, at E-32.
295 Raab & Susskind, supra note 198, at 12.
296 CARPENTER & KENNEDY, supra note 262, at 167-68.
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6. Failure to Agree, Partial Agreement, and Reverting to
Condemnation
The negotiation process will not take place independently, but within the
broader scope of FERC's extant siting procedure. Regional boards will agree
with private property holders as one of many factors in licensing
transmission facilities. When parties are unable to agree on certain issues,
utilities would continue with the siting process, including the right to use
eminent domain in district or state courts. As such, there is no reason why, at
a minimum, more input from the public cannot be gathered during the siting
process.297 At the very least, improved public participation would provide
298greater legitimacy to any ultimate condemnation of private property.
VII. CONCLUSION
"The U.S. power transmission system is in urgent need of modernization.
Growth in electricity demand and investment in new power plants has not
been matched by investment in new transmission facilities. ' 99
With several pending bills seeking to redesign the process for siting
interstate transmission lines, it is clear that Congress will not ignore the need
for improved transmission infrastructure. However, the pattern of regulation
under the NGA, EPAct 2005, and recent legislation convincingly
demonstrates that Congress may in fact ignore the plights of the landowners
whose property is likely to be condemned to make way for an expanded
transmission grid. Failure to adequately integrate landowners into the siting
process will not only violate the President's promise of a "transparent,
participatory, and collaborative government," 300 but will also fail to achieve
the streamlined siting process needed to efficiently update the grid.
With respect to the integration of landowners, any impending
amendments to EPAct 2005 are likely to replicate FERC's current procedure
for siting interstate transmission facilities. Though it does allow for public
participation to a limited extent, FERC's procedure fails to integrate
landowners in a meaningful manner, and as such may not satisfy due process
297 Raab & Susskind, supra note 198, at 13.
298 Id.
299 American Society of Civil Engineers, Report Card for America's Infrastructure:
Energy, http://www.asce.org/reportcard/2005/page.cfm?id=25 (last visited Mar. 31,
2010).
300 Memorandum on Transparency and Open Government, supra note 205.
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or states' freshly-minted eminent domain reform laws. Further, tension
between local siting authorities' attention to private property rights and
federal authorities' focus on broader energy needs has led to difficulties since
the enactment of the NGA in 1938. With America's recent struggle to
maintain an adequate transmission infrastructure, this tension has grown even
more pronounced.
A congressionally authorized mediation program has the ability to
address all of these difficulties. Integrating landowners early in the siting
process, but in a manner controlled through the use of a qualified mediator,
will allow siting authorities to strike a balance between local and national
needs without compromising the need to site transmission facilities
efficiently. Given the magnitude of America's need for an improved
transmission infrastructure, and its corresponding major implication for
private property interests across the country, it is clear that transmission lines
must be sited in a way that is sensitive to landowners' interests, but is also
expedient. Considering mediation's success in fostering a number of
collaborative agreements regarding land use, there is reason to be optimistic
that in this context, it can succeed.
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APPENDIX
State Bill and Applies Public Hearing Dispute Good Faith
Relevant to Requirement Resolution Negotiations
Statutes whom? Authorization Required?
/
Landowner
Assistance
Specifica
Ily
targets
electric
utilities.
None.H.B. 363,
Ga. Gen.
Assem
(2006).
GA.
CODE.
ANN.§
22-3-160
- 162
(2009)
Before exercising
right of eminent
domain, any
utility shall hold
one or more
public meetings
in each county in
which the
transmission line
would be located,
with an
opportunity for
comment by
members of the
public.
Includes
extensive public
notice
requirements.
In any county in
which the electric
transmission line
would require
acquisition of
property rights
from more than
50 property
owners, two or
more public
meetings shall be
After the
utility has
selected the
preferred
route for the
location of
an electric
transmission
line, the
utility shall
attempt in
good faith to
negotiate a
settlement
with each
property
owner from
whom the
utility needs
to acquire
property
rights for
the line. In
connection
with the
negotiations,
the utility
shall
provide the
property
owner with
a written
lVol. 26:1 20111
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I I ITheld. I I
4 .4. 4 +
S.F. No.
2846, 5th
Engrossm
ent - 84th
Leg.
(Minn.
2005-06).
MINN.
STAT.
ANN. §§
117.036,
117.0412,
117.189
(West
2010).
Exempts
"Public
Service
Corps.,"
including
utilities.
________ .1 .1. n
Yes.
Must hold at least
one public
hearing before a
local
government.
Condemnor must
notify each
owner of
property that may
be condemned of
the public
hearing.
None.
offer to
purchase the
property
rights, a
document
that
describes
the property
rights, and a
drawing that
shows the
location of
the line on
the owner's
property
Before
commencin
g an
eminent
domain
proceeding,
the
acquiring
authority
must make a
good faith
attempt to
negotiate
personally
with the
owner of the
property in
order to
acquire the
property by
direct
purchase
instead of
the use of
eminent
Minn.
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*1 domain{ proceedings.
Creates an
office of
ombudsman.
Ombudsman
should assist
citizens by
providing
guidance
regarding the
condemnatio
n process.
Ombudsman
also shall
submit a
yearly report
to the general
assembly on
the use of
eminent
domain.
Mo. None.Applies
to all
condemn
ors.
H.B.
1944,
2006 Gen.
Assem.
(Mo.
2006).
Mo. REV.
STAT.
§§523.256
,536.277-
section
does not
exist
(2010).
In absence
of good
faith
negotiations,
the court
shall dismiss
the
condemnati
on petition,
without
prejudice,
and shall
order the
condemning
authority to
reimburse
the owner
for his or
her actual
reasonable
attorneys'
fees and
costs
incurred
with respect
to the
condemnati
on
proceeding
which has
been
dismissed.
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Utah None.Applies
to all
condemn
ors.
H.B. 365,
2007 Gen
Sess.
(Utah
2007).
UT STAT.
§§ 78B-6-
505, 78B-
6-522
The private
property
owner may
submit the
dispute for
mediation or
arbitration to
the private
property
ombudsman.
A mediator
or arbitrator,
acting at the
request of the
property
owner, has
standing to
file with the
district court
a motion to
stay the
action during
the pendency
of the
mediation or
arbitration.
Condemnor
must advise
property
owner the
name and
telephone
number of a
property
rights
ombudsman.
Each person
who seeks
to acquire
property by
eminent
domain ...
shall make a
reasonable
effort to
negotiate
with the
property
owner for
the purchase
of the
property.
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W. H.B. Applies None. None. Condemnor
Va. 4048, to all must make a
2006 Leg. condemn reasonable
(W. Va. ors. attempt to
2006). notify all
parties
W. VA. subject to a
CODE petition for
ANN. § condemnati
54-1-2a). on, and
attempt to
enter into
negotiations
for purchase
of the
property
with the
owners.
Condemnor
shall make
an offer in
good faith
for the
purchase of
the property
prior to
initiation of
the
condemnati
on
proceeding.
Wyo. H.B. 124, Applies None. At any time Condemnor
59th Leg. to all in the shall make
2007 Gen. condemn negotiation, reasonable
Sess. ors. at the request and diligent
(Wyo. of either efforts to
2007) party and acquire
(2007). upon mutual property by
agreement, good faith
WYo.
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STAT.
ANN. § 1-
26-509
(2007).
dispute
resolution
processes
including
mediation or
arbitration
may be
employed, or
the informal
procedures
for resolving
disputes
established
pursuant to
W.S. 11-41-
101 through
11-41-110
may be
requested
through the
Wyoming
agriculture
and natural
resource
mediation
board.
negotiation.
Condemnee
must make
reasonable
and diligent
efforts to
negotiate in
good faith
with the
condemnor,
including a
timely
response to
the written
offer
specifying
areas of
disagreemen
t.
Condemnor
must offer
to tour
property
sought with
condemnee
or
condemnee'
s
representati
ve.
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